



# **INDIA'S ROLE IN THE FIRST TWO NON-ALIGNED SUMMITS**

**Dissertation Submitted for the Degree of  
Master of Philosophy**

**BY  
MOHAMMAD WAJID ALI**


**Under the Supervision of  
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**Department of Political Science  
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY  
ALIGARH**

**1987**



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## PREFACE

The wider acceptance of the policy of non-alignment by majority of countries has been the most remarkable event in the annals of international relations since the end of the Second World War. The advent of Cold War that ensued immediately in the post war period, witnessed the emergence of multilateral and bilateral military pacts or alliances sponsored by the United States and Soviet Union. Both Super Powers established military alliances in order to establish their spheres of influence in Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949 by the United States as its leading partner. A few years later the Soviet Union along with other allies of East Europe formed Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

Both Super Powers adopted various tactics like economic assistance and military aid to win over newly independent countries to their respective fold.

The conclusion of the Second World War had been instrumental in inaugurating the process of decolonization leading to the emergence of newly independent countries in Asia and Africa. These newly independent countries who have suffered a lot at the hand of colonial powers refused to align with either of the power blocs and decided to keep away from the cold war politics and pursued an inde-

pendent foreign policy. India gave a lead to these newly independent countries in this regard. Jawaharlal Nehru had declared in September 1946 that India on achieving independence would pursue an independent foreign policy, and would keep away from the power politics of military blocs.

In March 1947, India hosted an Asian Relations Conference which was attended by about two dozen countries mainly from Asia. This Conference echoed the desire of Asian countries to pursue an independent foreign policy. The attainment of independence by India in August 1947 was marked by India's commitment to the policy of keeping away from the military blocs. By 1950, Sri Lanka, Burma, Indonesia and other countries like Afghanistan and Nepal also expressed the desire of not aligning with military blocs and reiterated their determination to continue independent foreign policy. This policy of keeping away from military alliances was known till mid-1950 as the policy of neutrality.

In late 1950s, the term 'Non-Alignment' gained currency and the policy of neutrality in foreign affairs and keeping away from military alliances as pursued by the newly independent countries came to be known as the policy of non-alignment. The countries practising this policy came to be known as non-aligned countries. By the beginning of 1960s, the tidal waves of independence had swept

across the African continent where about half of the African countries had attained independence. The numerical strength of the non-aligned countries increased rapidly. India, Egypt, Indonesia and Yugoslavia being the pioneer non-aligned countries held negotiations to convene a summit conference of the countries professing and practising the policy of non-alignment with a view to strengthen the principles of non-alignment as an international movement. Prolonged negotiations in this regard resulted in conveying the First Summit Conference of non-aligned countries at Belgrade in Yugoslavia in September 1961. This was the first time that the non-aligned countries had held a Summit Conference. With the passage of time, more and more countries joined the non-aligned movement. There have been eight non-aligned summits and the later being held in Harare (Zimbabwe) in September 1986. The strength of the NAM has risen to more than 100 countries.

There is voluminous literature available on the various aspects of the non-aligned movement however the present researcher after scanning through the available material realized that there is still a paucity of serious academic study which could critically present an analytical study of India's role in the non-aligned movement. The present study is the result of this thinking. My dissertation is an analytical study of India's role in the first two summits of the non-aligned movement.

The first chapter of the present study deals with the theoretical aspects of non-alignment such as its meanings, distinction from neutrality Power Politics and Military Alliances. The second chapter deals with the growth of the non-alignment and India's role in the evolution of the NAM. The third chapter deals with the first Summit of the non-aligned countries held at Belgrade in September 1961. It further makes an indepth assessment of India's role in the first Summit. The fourth chapter deals with the second Summit Conference held at Cairo in 1964. It also highlights and critically examines India's role in strengthening the non-aligned movement.

I am grateful to my Supervisor, Dr Miss Iqbal Khanam, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, for her keen interest, inspiring guidance and expert supervision of my work.

I am indebted to Professor A.F. Usmani, Chairman, Department of Political Science, and Professor S.A.H. Bilgrami, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, for their valuable suggestions and constant encouragement. I also owe my intellectual indebtedness to Professor S.A.H. Haqqi, former Head of the Department of Political Science, AMU., for his valuable suggestions.


I am also beholden to the Librarians and staff members of the Sapru House Library, (Indian Council of World

Affairs), ICSSR Library, (Indian Council of Social Science Research), Teen Murti (Nehru Memorial Library), New Delhi, Maulana Azad Library and the Seminar Library of the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, for the cooperation and help they extended at every stage during the progress of this work.

I am particularly thankful to my parents, Haji Mahmood Ali and Hajia Raisa Begum, for their continuous encouragement throughout the crucial stages of my research work, and brothers and sisters for their wholehearted cooperation and more specially to Alhaj Mohd Ahmad Ali, for his financial help without which it would have been impossible for me to complete this work. Last but not least I am indebted to Mr M.S. Afridi, who typed this dissertation within a short period.

In the preparation of this study I have tried my best to utilize all available material on the subject but I have largely relied on official documents, books, articles, journals and newspapers, etc.

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## Chapter I

N O N - A L I G N M E N T

The most spectacular development wielding tremendous influence on international affairs in the post-second World War was the emergence of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM). It is the most potent force which is instrumental in shaping the nature and content of international relations. NAM forms the basis of foreign policies practised by over hundred countries which are called non-aligned countries. Majorities of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are members of the NAM. There has been a rapid proliferation of the NAM in recent years. Its membership has enhanced from 25 in 1961 when first summit was held in Belgrade to over 101 at the Seventh Nam summit held in New Delhi in March 1983. More and more countries not only of the Third World but from the Europe are also showing willingness to join the movement. Some countries like Romania, Philippines, and Portugal which are members of the military blocs and neutrals like Sweden and Switzerland have also attended various NAM summits as observer guests. This proves the growing strength of the NAM.

Non-alignment functions 'simultaneously as a foreign policy strategy and as an ideology for political change of

the contemporary international system'.<sup>1</sup> The analysis of non-alignment in the foreign policy perspective requires a case-study approach which being the main theme of the present study will be analysed in succeeding chapter.

### Meaning of Non-alignment

The term "Non-alignment" has been in vogue since early 1950s and the NAM has never cared to define authoritatively, comprehensively and precisely the concept of non-alignment even after seven summits and numerous other inter-governmental conferences<sup>2</sup> for over two decades. Even the First Summit Conference held at Belgrade in 1961 did not care to deliberate on this aspect. The Fourth Summit Conference held in Algiers in 1973 did provide an occasion when a Libyan proposal raised the issue for a new definition as stricter interpretation of the concept of non-alignment. The lack of consensus facilitated the exclusion of this issue from the agenda of the conference.

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1. Robin Alison Remington, "The Non-aligned Context: Problems and Prospects", Punjab Journal of Politics (Amritsar), Vol. VI, No. 1, January-June, 1982, p.205.
  2. M.S. Rajan, "The Concept of Non-Alignment and the Basis of Membership of the Movement", in K.P. Misra and K.R. Narayan, (eds.) Non-Alignment in Contemporary International Relations (New Delhi, 1981), p. 231.

The sixth Non-aligned summit Conference held in Havana in September 1979 witnessed the Burmese delegation making a proposal for the dissolution of the movement and establish a committee to define the movement's principles.<sup>3</sup> Burma's proposal was not accepted by the Havana Summit. Various efforts have been made to define the term "non-alignment" within and without the non-aligned summit conferences. But no 'authoritative statement of the policy or for a definition of the concept by the collective wisdom of the movement itself'<sup>4</sup> has emerged so far.

The pioneers of the movement-Tito, Nehru and Nasser, made various statements on non-alignment, most of which dealt with only as particular or transient elements or aspects of the policy reflecting their respective geopolitical standpoints. Even an analysis of the declaration and joint communiques issued by the Summit Conferences and Ministerial Conferences of the NAM from Belgrade (1961) to New Delhi (1983) provides no authentic, comprehensive and self-contained definition of non-alignment.

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3. Burmese delegate Myint Maung at Havana Summit, Addresses Delivered at the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (Havana, 1980), pp. 147-48.

4. Rajan, n.2, p. 231.

The Belgrade declaration (1961) provided no definition of the term "non-alignment", however, it envisaged that the Summit Conference 'do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc'.<sup>5</sup> The declaration issued after the second Summit Conference held at Cairo in 1964 was also silent on it and introduced two new elements 'the policy of active peaceful co-existence'<sup>6</sup> and 'the existence of military blocs, Great Power alliance and pacts arising therefrom has accentuated the cold war'.<sup>7</sup> The subsequent summit declarations even went on adding new appendages without defining the concept of non-alignment. The Algerian Summit envisaged a scheme of "international security".<sup>8</sup> The last Communique of the preparatory meeting for the Lusaka Conference of non-aligned states issued at Dar-es-Salam in April 1970, reaffirmed the will of the non-aligned countries to adhere to the 'principles and criteria of non-alignment as expressed at the non-aligned conferences of Belgrade and Cairo'.<sup>9</sup>

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5. Documents of the Gatherings of Non-aligned Countries 1961-78 (Belgrade, 1973), p. 139.

6. Ibid., p. 19.

7. Ibid., p. 25.

8. Ibid., p. 91.

9. Ibid., p. 37.

Even the Lusaka Summit Conference held in September 1970 observed that 'what is needed is not a redefinition of non-alignment but a rededication by all non-aligned nations to its central aims and objectives'.<sup>10</sup> The Algiers Summit held in 1973 referred to only unspecified aims, principles and practices of the non-alignment. The emphasis of the Colombo Summit held in 1976, was on exercising increasing vigilance by its members to 'preserve intact the essential character of non-alignment, maintain unswerving fidelity to its principles and policies'.<sup>11</sup> The Havana Summit (1979) and New Delhi Summit (1983) also echoed the previous thinking leaving the definition part untouched.

One can easily surmise from these facts that the NAM itself has failed to provide an authentic comprehensive definition, the absence of which has envisaged 'a source of conceptual as well as institutional weakness and a major cause of the wide gap between the theory of the non-alignment and the practice of non-aligned states, individually and collectively'.<sup>12</sup> Leo Mates defends the virtue of NAM for not going in for a single authorised definition of non-alignment. He opines:

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10. Ibid., p. 45.

11. Ibid., p. 179.

12. Rajan, n.2, p. 238.

It is not unreasonable to say that there are as many definitions of non-alignment as there are non-aligned countries and even possibly more ... In a certain sense it can be said that the policy of non-alignment has permanently been undergoing change definition, re-examination and criticism while resisting arbitrary assessment --- All this is understandable since the movement of the non-aligned countries is something new in international relations, not only because of a common platform but also because of the form of cooperation among a large number of generally dissimilar countries.<sup>13</sup>

There could be endless argument over the meaning of non-alignment or what defines a non-aligned country.<sup>14</sup> The meaning of non-alignment cannot be sought from outside, its meaning is manifest within the texts jointly negotiated and agreed to at the various Non-aligned Summit Conferences. Though Peter Willetts has observed that a Non-aligned Country is 'one that has joined an international organization with other countries that call themselves non-aligned',<sup>15</sup> but his definition is not adequate enough to comprehend the concept of non-alignment.

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13. Leo Mates, Non-Alignment : Theory and Current Policy, (Belgrade, 1972), pp. 80-81.

14. Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned in Havana : Documents of the Sixth Summit Conference and an Analysis of Their Significance for the Global Political System, (London, 1981), p. 3.

15. Ibid.

Non-alignment is a dynamic, positive and active concept and so is its ever growing movement whose strength and acceptance is growing from summit to summit. John Burton while tackling the problem of definition of non-alignment, wrote immediately after the Belgrade Summit Conference:

So far non-alignment has been studied primarily in national context; non-alignment is Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, India ... Alone these national studies are not satisfactory, for they do not distinguish those national influences which are unique to non-alignment, from others which are common to aligned and to non-aligned alike.<sup>16</sup>

Burton's above statement is still valid today when more than one hundred countries are the members of the NAM. These countries' policies are governed by their respective national interests, Indonesia adopted non-alignment as soon as she became independent because:

- (1) She needed a diverse market for her varied products which otherwise would tie her to the economies of a few countries.
- (2) because the Indonesian people were traditionally friend of all races.
- (3) because Indonesia was not on an invasion route, and
- (4) because alignment with a particular bloc would make the task of internal reconstruction more difficult.

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16. J.W. Burton, International Relations : A General Theory, (London, 1967), pp. 165-6.

Burma too freely choose non-alignment for geographic reasons that are the opposite of Indonesia with two great neighbours, non-communist India and Communist China a middle way was the least controversial position to adopt. Heavily dependent on finding markets for its major crop, rice, Burma found her main buyers in the communist bloc but it was also necessary to retain its economic link with the west for fostering the process of economic development.

Its geographical position wedged between China and India led Nepal also into the non-aligned group.

Sri Lanka's non-alignment is a by product of its trade links while she exports tea exclusively to western countries it is the largest seller of rubber to communist countries.

The non-alignment of the Arab States is the result of anger over the creation of Israel which was approved by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations in 1948.

For some new states of Africa non-alignment had become so much a part of Afro-Asian politics by the time they achieved independence that they really had little choice but to swim with the tide. Non-alignment was an easy policy for African Countries to implement because they are geographically far from the Zone of the 'cold



war' because this policy opens the way to economic aid from both sides and because it might conceivably help in keeping that continent a nuclear free zone.

Yugoslavia found herself non-aligned because as a deserter from the communist bloc, she was an anathema in the communist world and at the same time she was unacceptable to the West.

Jawaharlal Nehru, while speaking on India's understanding of the non-alignment said on 9 December, 1948:

When we say our policy is one of non-alignment, obviously we mean non-alignment with military blocs ... This in itself is not a policy, it is only part of a policy ...<sup>17</sup>

He further observed that the policy could only be a policy of acting according to one's best judgement and furthering the objectives and ideals cherished by one's country. Nehru further opined:

Every country's foreign policy, first of all is concerned with its own security and with protecting its own progress ... A deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes further in gaining security than almost any thing else. Apart from this, from the larger point of view of the world also, we have laboured to the best of our ability, for world peace ... Our foreign policy has thus positive aspect of peace. The other positive

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17. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy Selected Speeches September, 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi, 1961), p. 79.

aspects are an enlargement of freedom in the world, replacement of colonialism by free and independent countries and a large degree of cooperation among nations.<sup>18</sup>

Nehru's assertion of "acting according to our best Judgement" and "an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue", did not mean objectivity or impartiality as frequently interpreted by some scholars both in India and abroad.<sup>19</sup>

Prior to the holding of the First Non-aligned Summit at Belgrade in 1961, the term "non-alignment" was used to be denoted by words and phrases like "neutrality", "non-involvement", "positive neutrality", and "Neutralism".

The term "non-alignment" was firstly used by V.K. Krishna Menon at the United Nations in 1953-54.<sup>20</sup> Leo Mates also attributes to Krishna Menon for coining the term "non-alignment" but there is a difference of period. He says: "There may have been an earlier use of the word

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18. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

19. J.W. Burton n. 16, p. 220. Many Western Scholars have criticized non-aligned nations for lack of objectivity in matters of vital significance to them. See Bertrand Russell, Unarmed Victory (Middlesex, 1963), p. 64. See also William C. Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy : A Study in Neutralism, (Massachusetts, 1963), p. 277. See also J.B. Kripalani, "For Principled Neutrality", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol.38, No.1, October 1959, p.58.

20. For details see, Michael Brecher, India and World Politics : Krishna Menon's View of the World (London, 1968), p.3, Oxford University Press, Toronto Bombay.

relating to the concept as it was worked out by the non-aligned countries, but I found the earliest source in the Times of India of September 30, 1968, where Krishna Menon in an interview remembered having used the term non-alignment for the first time in 1950."<sup>21</sup>

On the basis of the above analysis, it can safely be surmised that NAM being a dynamic and ever growing movement does not need a definition. Once a term is defined it is limited within certain contours which cannot be easily violated.

#### Evolution of the Concept of Non-Alignment

The concept of non-alignment has not been evolved all of a sudden. Its evolution has been facilitated as a consequence of the experience of newly independent states with the passage of time during the post-World War II period. Following the end of the Second World War, there were a few neutral or neutralist but no non-aligned states.<sup>22</sup> The edifice of the non-alignment has been built

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21. Leo Mates, "The Concept of Non-Alignment", in Uma Vasudev, (ed.,) Issues Before Non-Alignment : Past and Future (New Delhi, 1983), p. 60 (ICWA).
  22. Bimal Prasad, The General Experience of Non-Alignment and Its Prospects for the Future (New Delhi, 1968), p. 1.

during the last three decades, 'a process in which the professions and practices of the non-aligned states and the summit conferences from Belgrade to New Delhi, through collective articulation of the ideas and ideals of the movement, have played a significant role.'<sup>23</sup>

The evolution of the non-alignment as a movement in the historical context is analysed indepth in the next chapter. It seems suffice here to describe the evolution of the concept as such. The evolution of non-alignment was not the result of any pre-conceived idea or prior consultation among these countries but it was facilitated owing to certain common experiences, ideals, and aspirations which these countries shared in varying degrees. The late President Soekarno of Indonesia's address to the Belgrade Conference in 1961 aptly summed up this aspect:

There was no prior consultation and agreement between us before we adopted our respective policies of non-alignment. We each arrived at this policy inspired by common ideals prompted by similar circumstances,

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23. K.P. Misra, "The Conceptual Profile of Non-Alignment", in K.P. Misra and K.R. Narayan, (eds.) Non-Alignment in Contemporary International Relations (New Delhi, 1981), p. 197.

spurred on by like experiences. There was no attempt at compromise among us, no attempt to round off disengagements to make our policies identical. But not one of us, I think will deny that we did inspire each other'. The experiences of one country in discovering that a policy of non-alignment is the best guarantee for safeguarding our national and international position have undoubtedly helped others to come to a similar conclusion.<sup>24</sup>

The non-aligned countries had the common experience of having been subjected to alien rule for centuries. The resources of these colonized countries were used by the imperial powers for the furtherance of colonial power. After attaining independence, these countries had realized the perils of being party to power politics. It was that realization which prompted the newly independent countries to keep away from the politics of power blocs. These countries pursued the policy of non-alignment in order to give fuller meaning and content to their newly acquired but hard won political independence.

The former Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manely, while emphasising this aspect has written that 'the non-aligned movement did begin simply because there

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24. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (Belgrade, 1961), pp. 25-26.

were blocs.<sup>25</sup>

Thus as the number of newly independent countries after shaking off colonial yoke increased especially after the Belgrade Non-aligned Summit of 1961, the membership of the NAM also increased. The Belgrade Summit was attended by 25 countries and since then the NAM has come a long way. The Seventh NAM Summit at New Delhi held in March 1983 was attended by over one hundred countries as fulfilled members. It is an over-growing and dynamic movement.

#### Non-Alignment and Neutrality

Prior to the concept of non-alignment gaining currency and recognition as Non-aligned Movement. The policy of non-alignment was generally identified with the terms like "neutrality", and in the early years of the cold war, the term "neutrality" was frequently used to denote the policy of the non-aligned countries. Although neutrality and non-alignment are not synonymous. But the term non-alignment was identified with neutrality and West-

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25. Michael Manely, "Third World Under Challenge : The Politics of Confrontation", Third World Quarterly (London), January 1980, p. 29.

ern Scholars and Statesmen were obsessed with this term,<sup>26</sup> and they preferred to use "neutrality" or "neutralism" in the place of non-alignment for some time and one can even now come across these terms in the current literature on non-alignment.

According to Peter Lyon neutrality means non-involvement in war and neutralism means non-involvement in the cold war however Jawaharlal Nehru the founder of non-alignment did not like to call India's policy of non-alignment even of positive neutrality.

A scenario of bipolarity is sought to be established between non-alignment and neutrality, one section is of the view that the two concepts have nothing in common<sup>27</sup> and other insist that the two are identical or at any rate similar in their essentials,<sup>28</sup> but the truth lies somewhere in the middle.

26. K.P. Misra, "The Concept of Non-Alignment : Its Implications and Recent Trends", in K.P. Misra (ed.,) Studies in Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1969), p. 90.

27. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, pp. 24, 58 and 86; see also Peter Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester, 1963), p. 183.

28. For details see L.W. Martin, Neutralism and Non-Alignment (New York, 1962).

With a view to have an analytical assessment of the distinction between neutrality and non-alignment, it is essential to understand the concept of neutrality.

Neutrality is an integral part of the International law of warfare and a neutral state, is, by virtue of an international treaty or a binding unilateral declaration, under a legal obligation, not to participate in any future war. It is incumbent on a neutral state to observe the norms of the law of neutrality whenever a war as defined by international law breaks out. These obligations which are primarily based on the Hague Convention of 1907 and partly based on customary law are to be of four types:<sup>29</sup>

(i) The Obligation of Absentation

A neutral state must not directly or indirectly provide belligerents with military support.

(ii) Obligation of Prevention

Neutrals are not to permit states involved in a war to engage in military activities on their territories.

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29. See for detail Hanspeter Neuhold, "Permanent Neutrality and Non-Alignment : Similarities and Differences", India Quarterly (New Delhi), Vol. 35, No. 3, (1979), pp. 285-87 - July-September A Journal of International Affairs.



(iii) Principle of Impartiality

It enjoins upon the neutral states the obligation of treating belligerent states on equal footing, in all those non-military sector where no obligations of abstentions exist.

(iv) Obligation of Tolerance

The neutral state must put up with certain acts by belligerents which in peace time would be clearly illegal.

Like neutrality non-alignment is not a corrolary of any written international agreement. A non-aligned state is not under the legal obligation not participate in any future war. It is free to participate or not to participate in any war. Non-Alignment is virtually the main foreign policy line determining a country's Foreign Political activities in war as well as in peace time.

Neutrality and non-alignment, however entail similarities as well as differences. The most common similarity between permanent neutrality and non-alignment pertains to non-participation in military alliances, even among permanently neutral or non-aligned countries themselves. The permanently neutral countries are legally prohibited in this regard but the refusal of non-aligned countries to enter into military alliance is based solely on political maxim.

This non-participation has been restricted from the very beginning, to multilateral military alliance and

other agreement 'concluded in the context of great power conflicts',<sup>30</sup> which almost remained unspecified. As is well known, the very *raison d'être* of the advent of non-alignment was its desire not to get involved in the Cold War. Consequently the membership of military alliances such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, CENTO, SEATO or ANZUS pact was regarded as out of question for a non-aligned state. Yet, Organization of American States (OAS) did not fall into the category of unacceptable alliances; for Cuba was one of the founding members of the movement which in recent years was joined by several other Latin American states, too. The same seems also to apply, for instance, both to France's multilateral military arrangement with the Defence Council of Equatorial Africa and bilateral military treaties concluded by the United Kingdom with ten states, all of whom were admitted to non-aligned conferences.<sup>31</sup> Obviously, all these arrangements were excluded from "the context of Great Powers conflicts."

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30. O. Jankoartsch and K.P. Sauvart, The Third World Without Super Powers : The Collected Documents of the Non-aligned Countries (London, 1975), p.31.

31. Peter Willetts, n. 14, p. 37. Nine of the 25 "radical core group" states which attended the 1961 Belgrade "Summit" had strong military ties with the United States or the United Kingdom, *Ibid.*, p. 23.

Thus neutrality is a legal status consisting of well defined rights and obligations, to which the state is bound and is not free to alter unilaterally or terminate at will, but the principles of non-alignment are not legally binding on the states subscribing to them; they solely amount to a political doctrine from which deviation is permissible.

An attempt has also been made by some scholars to establish relationship between non-alignment and Power Politics. Non-alignment has been labelled as a policy based on morality and idealism on the one hand and on the other it has been described as an exercise in power politics.<sup>32</sup>

Power politics is beyond the scope of our present study. However, to make distinction clear between non-alignment and power politics, it seems sufficient to quote George Schwarzenberger, who defines power politics as "signifying a type of relations between states in which certain patterns of behaviour are predominant:

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32. For an interesting debate on this relationship, see A.P. Rana, "The Nature of India's Foreign Policy", India Quarterly, Vol. 22 (1966), pp. 103-139. See also A.P. Rana, Imperatives of Non-Alignment : A Conceptual Study of India's Foreign Policy Strategy in the Nehru Period (Delhi, 1976). See also a rejoinder to A.P. Rana's view by G.L. Jain, "Indian Non-alignment and Balance of Power", India Quarterly, Vol. 22 (1966), pp. 145-54.

armaments, isolationism, power diplomacy, power economics, balance of power and war" subsequently he says that "power politics may be defined as a system of international relations in which groups consider themselves to be ultimate ends."<sup>33</sup> According to Prof. K.P. Misra, non-alignment 'rejects this variety of politics and attempts to highlight an organic link between the constituents of the international community ... It rejects not only power politics but also the view held by Hans Morgenthau and others, that all politics is a struggle for power'.<sup>34</sup> Thus non-alignment is devoid of all such ambiguities and is rather a 'substitute for power politics in international relations'.<sup>35</sup>

#### Military Pacts, Alliances and Non-Alignment

Last but not least important point to be noted here is about the wrong understanding of non-alignment is that the non-aligned movement has recently been termed as a third World Alliance. The use of the term alliance for non-aligned movement is certainly objectionable because like "power politics" alliance too has come to acquire a

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33. George Schwarzenberger, Power Politics (New York, 1951), p. 13.

34. Misra, n. 23, p. 204.

35. Ibid.

distinct meaning in international relations. The emergence of the concept of non-alignment as an unprecedented phenomena of the post-Second World War was mainly due to the formation of military pacts or alliances by the Great Powers in the wake of cold war. When the Cold War was at its peak and hotly chased, Nehru had declared on 7 September 1947 : 'we propose, as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale'.<sup>36</sup> Though Nehru had made the above statement in the context of India which had been in the process of attaining independence from the British colonial yoke, it became the cornerstone not only of India's foreign policy but other newly independent countries as well in the years to come, within few years, it proved to become the sheet anchor of "Asian Neutralism", which, according to K.M. Panikkar, was a characteristic of the twentieth century politics.<sup>37</sup>

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36. Government of India, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, September - 1946, May 1949, Second edn. (New Delhi, Publication Division, 1958), p. 2.

37. K.M. Panikkar, "The Twentieth Century in Asia and World Politics", India Quarterly (New Delhi), Vol. 12, July-September 1956, pp. 245-56.

Conclusion of the Second World War envisaged substantial changes in the contemporary political scenario. The war time allies — Soviet Union and the United States — emerged as rivals to each other in the post-war period. The traditional colonial powers like Britain, France, Germany and Italy were relegated to secondary place. The decline in colonialism marked the inauguration of the process of decolonization which resulted in the emergence of newly independent countries.

The United States and the Soviet Union established military alliances in Europe, Asia and the Middle East in order to increase their respective spheres of influence in the world and to win over the newly independent countries to their respective spheres of influence.

The establishment of military alliance by the Super Powers, was deemed as a potent danger to their independence and sovereignty by the newly independent countries who had determined to preserve their hard-won freedom.

The newly independent countries who wanted to remain free in international affairs decided to keep them away from these military alliances of Super Powers and pursued an independent foreign policy. It was this common desire of the newly independent countries which manifested itself in the form of non-aligned movement (NAM). India, as already mentioned, had decided to pursue the policy of

non-alignment even prior to attaining independence. The other countries of Asia like Burma, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Indonesia also pursued the similar policy. India was latter joined by Egypt and Yugoslavia. With the passage of time the policy of non-alignment became the cornerstone of the foreign policy of these countries. Currently the policy of non-alignment is being practised by over one hundred countries. These non-aligned countries are not only militarily non-aligned to the military pacts or alliances or pacts patronized by the Super Powers but even among themselves. The non-aligned countries are bound together not through a charter or constitution or defence pact but by their desire to respect the principles of non-alignment to achieve some common objectives of the policy of non-alignment.

The distinction between the military alliances and non-alignment seems essential to analyse the various aspects of these concepts.

The term "alliance" is generally used as conveying military sense. Arnold Wolfers has observed that in the technical language of statesmen and scholars "alliances" signifies a promise of mutual military alliances between two or more sovereign states.<sup>38</sup> He further says: 'Although

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38. Arnold Wolfers, "Alliance", International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (New York, 1968), Vol.I, p. 268.

some propagandist advantages may be gained by applying the term to loose agreements for cooperation ... this use obscures the peculiarly far-reaching commitment contained in military pacts by which a nation formally promises to join another in fighting a common enemy'.<sup>39</sup> Thus an alliance essentially connotes its military contents prominently.

On the basis of the above analysis, it seems suffice to infer that while an alliance is essentially military in character but Non-Aligned Movement is basically opposed to the military alliances. The policy of non-alignment gained prominence during the Cold War period. In fact the policy of non-alignment was a revolt against the Cold War and military alliances conceived in the context of the Cold War. This policy was pursued by the countries which were not going to be involved in the Cold War. The founding member countries of the NAM India, Yugoslavia and Egypt had one of the many things in common was their opposition to Great Power alliance. Egypt was opposed to the Baghdad Pact, India to the Baghdad Pact and to the SEATO,<sup>40</sup> while Yugoslavia was opposed to the Warsaw Pact.

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39. Ibid.

40. For India's Attitude Towards SEATO and SENTO see Iqbal Khanam, "India's Attitude Towards Regional Alliances", International Studies, Vol. 18, No.1, January-March 1979, pp. 89-104.



The NAM summits have laid emphasis on the dismantling of military alliances and even foreign military bases in other countries. It is a well known fact that the super powers are not bound by the advice of the non-aligned countries and hence the chances of dismantling of the NATO and Warsaw Pact are not even remote. Keeping this fact in view, the non-aligned countries have to co-exist and as such NAM has laid emphasis on not allowing the non-aligned countries for the establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases. This view gained prominence at the preparatory meeting at Cairo in June 1961. The Belgrade declaration declared:

... they consider the establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries, particularly against their expressed wishes to be a gross violation of the sovereignty of such states... They call upon countries which maintain foreign bases seriously to consider their abolition as a contribution to world peace.<sup>41</sup>

The Cairo Declaration (1964) was almost the same. The Lusaka Conference (1970) envisaged two new elements. It urged for the dissolution of great powers military alliances.<sup>42</sup> It further agreed to safeguard international

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41. Belgrade Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (Belgrade, 1961), p. 273.

42. Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), no. 491, September 1970, p. 25.

peace and security through the development of social economic, political and military strength of each country.<sup>43</sup>

The subsequent NAM summit conference has also reiterated the same stance. Thus Non-Alignment is an alternative to military alliance. The growth or perpetuation of military alignments is bound to give rise to alignments and re-alignments resulting in the exacerbating of tension which may lead to war. On the other hand, the policy of Non-Alignment is the Harbinger of peace.

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43. Ibid.

## Chapter II

INDIA AND THE EVOLUTION OF NON-ALIGNED  
MOVEMENT

International relations in the Post War period have been greatly influenced by three main forces: western bloc led by the United States, eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union and the non-aligned countries. There is no denying the fact that the two super powers have been the major actors in the world drama, the non-aligned countries too have played significant role in shaping the events. The Post War period has witnessed the increasing importance of non-alignment as a movement and as a force to be reckoned within international politics.

India is the founder of non-alignment. The policy of non-alignment was formulated by Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, in the context of the cold war. Nehru wanted to keep India away from the politics of the Cold War because he considered the "cold war" worse than the shooting war. India's policy of non-alignment was based on India's geo-political standing its desire to play an independent role in international affairs, to get economic assistance from both the power blocs and to protect its security and to promote its vital interest.

India's policy of non-alignment, was a revolt against existing International Politics of the Cold War and military alliances. The main principles of non-alignment as explained by Nehru were peace, opposition to Colonialism, Racial discrimination, Support to Afro-Asian Community of Nations and International Organisation for the maintenance of peace and security. India's policy of non-alignment, was conveyed to other nations through the diplomacy of panchsheel. The policy of non-alignment was welcomed by all the newly independent states, and most of the states of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, adopted the Policy of Non-alignment.

Though non-alignment as a movement dates back to the first Summit Conference held in Belgrade in 1961. Its policy and principles had been spelt out much earlier by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, even before India achieved independence, in his historic announcement on the future directions of India's Foreign Policy, made on September 7, 1946, during the days of the interim government, Nehru said:

We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of Groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to Conflict and War. We are particularly interested in

the emancipation of Colonial and dependent Countries and Peoples, and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races.<sup>1</sup>

Since this concept was put forward in a cohesive form by Nehru, the non-aligned movement had developed into a powerful and respected International Forum, which had been able to make a significant contribution in the direction of World Peace and Security the elimination of evils of colonialism, racial discrimination and for the establishment of a just and equitable international economic and social order.

In the early years, the impetus for non-aligned movement came from the Conferences both of which were held on the Continent of Asia, which were the Asian relations Conferences held in New Delhi in 1947 and thereafter in 1949, and the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Countries held in Indonesia in 1955. These Conferences showed the tremendous support given to the policy of non-alignment by the newly independent Countries of Asia and Africa. They demonstrated wide sphered recognition of the importance of avoiding domination or subjugation to either of the powers blocs and the need instead to work for democratisation of international political system.

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1. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946 - April 1961. The Publications Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi.

(a) Post-War Political Situation

With a view to analyse the evolution of the policy of non-alignment and its increasing popularity among the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, it deems essential to briefly survey the international scene and the internal conditions, obtaining in these countries after the end of the Second World War. The immediate period succeeding the conclusion of the World War II was marked by two main factors - emergence of the Cold War between the two Super Powers and breaking up of the colonial system.

It was in the wake of a rapidly declining international situation, endangered by cold war rivalries, which still held the world on the threshold of a third world war, that a number of Asian and later African countries, obtained national independence. The upsurge of nationalism facilitated the process of independence. The colonial and under-developed countries of Asia like India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Burma, etc., witnessed the emergence of strong anti-colonial movements striving for national independence. Soon after, West Asia, too, was undergoing a revolutionary upheaval, the discontent, finding manifestation against the Palestine policies and politico-economic domination of the countries of the region by western powers, especially Britain and France.

The Paris Conference of 1946, witnessed a widening rift between the Allied Powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union about the sharing of the spoils of the victory. The true spirit of Yalta and Potsdam conferences seemed to disappear, giving rise to Cold War rivalries. The dissolution of old colonial empires and the emergence of new independent countries was a new characteristics of the contemporary international politics.

The emergence of Asia, Africa, and gradually Latin America, the revolt against Europeans rule and the accelerated collapse of imperialism, all served to change the world political scene beyond recognition.<sup>2</sup> Another remarkable development of this period was the founding of the United Nations on the belief that it could help reduce the tension in the world and bring peace and prosperity throughout the world.

The decline of the Kuomintang Government and rise of the Communist Party to power, in the mainland of China, was also, in a way a part of this nationalist upsurge on the one hand the nationalist upsurge was gaining ground mainly in Asia in the second half of 1940s, whereas on the

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2. V.P. Dutt, "Non-alignment in a Changed World : An Outline", in M.K. Saini, (ed.,) Aspects of Non-Alignment (New Delhi, 1981), p. 13.

other hand, the nations of the world were divided into two power blocs under the aegis of USA and USSR. The traditions and experiences of the newly independent countries, where nationalist upsurge was prominent found it difficult to identify themselves with either of the power blocs. Leo Mates observes, that the US and the Soviet Union had emerged as the main contenders for the arms race which commenced after the war. These two Super Powers were primarily the former allies and it was their differences from the time of the second world war rather than their cooperation which affected the course of international affairs in succeeding years.<sup>3</sup>

India, Indonesia and Burma adopted the parliamentary system of government. "The leadership of their respective nationalist movement was usually vested in the educated middle classes who were trained to think and speak in terms of western political theory and ideals."<sup>4</sup> However, the prevailing differences in local conditions had been instrumental in giving indigenous orientations to the political theory and ideals.

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3. Leo Mates, Non-Alignment : Theory and Current Policy (Belgrade, 1972), p. 22.

4. N.P. Nair, "Non-Alignment : History, Ideology and Prospects", in K.P. Karunakaran, (ed.), Outside the Context (New Delhi, 1963), p. 27.



The newly independent countries of Asia had developed a basic distrust towards western powers which largely arose from the imperialist character of the latter. The western power's argument that they were trying to preserve democracy against totalitarian communism, failed to evoke response from the newly independent countries of Asia. Though the United States was more or less free from charges of direct colonialism unlike other western powers like Britain and France, but the US policy in Philippines and Latin America had given rise to misgivings and doubts.<sup>5</sup>

At the same time, the newly independent countries were also averse to a total alignment with the Soviet bloc. The nationalist movements in these countries were largely pioneered by middle class intellectuals who were in no sense communists or socialists. The socialist or communist stance in these nationalist movements was too mild to influence the general political or social character of these movements. However, the impressive economic achievements of the Soviet Union and its consistent anti-imperialist attitude had developed a favourable attitude about the Soviet Union among these countries. But the newly indepen-

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5. For details see Malvin Gurtov, The United States Against the Third World : Anti-nationalism and Intervention (New York, 1974), pp. 48-60. See also M.L. Sharma Terrorism : American Style (New Delhi, 1983), pp. 13-17.

dent countries were opposed to align with the Soviet bloc.

These countries tended to view the big-power politics with suspicion and kept themselves aloof from it. They disfavoured to recognise the leadership or guidance of any power bloc in their national or international policies. Thus the policy of non-alignment with power blocs was an off-shoot of the sentiments of nationalism in these countries. The pursuit of an "independent" foreign policy by these countries was in consonance with their national pride and sense of independence. These countries also realised that the pursuit of the policy of non-alignment was not only helpful in preserving their newly won independence, but it also provided them a sense of dignity and recognition in world affairs.

(b) Decline of Colonialism

The conclusion of the Second World War inaugurated the process of decolonization, which was subsequently a pre-requisite for the evolution of the policy of non-alignment on a global scale. The common factor which had prompted the Afro-Asian countries to be knitted together, in an endeavour to find a new and a separate identity for themselves, was a commonly shared experience of humiliation and oppression under the imperial powers. Almost

two centuries of foreign rule had "produced as instinctive antagonism to any form of western domination and an intense hostility to racial discrimination".<sup>6</sup>

The main reason for distrust of western powers among the countries of Asia and Africa can be attributed to the imperialist character of most western powers. Under foreign rule almost all of them were dragged into innumerable wars in pursuit of the politics and interests of the imperial powers. Its resultant effect was that the newly independent countries "developed a strong urge to maintain their independence in foreign affairs and to keep away from the policies being pursued by the big powers for their own purposes."<sup>7</sup> The progress in the struggle for freedom proved instrumental in developing an equally strong urge in these countries to play their due role in world affairs. They were anxious to contribute to the ever continuing struggle for peace and freedom. Such urges could find manifestation through the policy of non-alignment.

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6. Malabika Banerjee, The Non-Aligned Movement (Calcutta, 1982), p. 4.

7. Bimal Prasad, "The Evolution of Non-alignment", in Uma Vasudeva, (ed.), Issues Before Non-alignment : Past and Future, (New Delhi, 1983), p. 35.

Independence from the colonial rule first dawned on South and Sout-east Asia which subsequently spread to other countries. The waves of independence swept across the African continent in the later half of 1950s and by the beginning of 1960, barring a handful colonial outposts like South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia, the majority of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America had attained independence by shaking off the shackles of colonialism.

(c) Newly Independent Countries and Their Problems

The newly independent countries of Asia and Africa were faced with the then problems of preserving their newly but hard won freedom and carry on the task of economic development. As discussed in preceding pages, these countries pursued the policy of non-alignment in the wake of the cold war with a view to preserve their political independence.

The long years of colonial rule had led to economic strangulation of these countries. This provided them an unequal position in their relations with more developed countries. As Leo Mates has observed: "Under-development and slow economic growth caused internal instability and political problems which offered opportunities for pressure from outside influence and even for open forms of in-

tervention and interference in those countries internal affairs."<sup>8</sup> Thus the urge for modernization and rapid economic and social development became the immediate goals of these countries. However, the success of socio-economic policy was dependent on peaceful conditions, domestically and internationally. The fear of another war which could destroy their political independence always loomed larger before the newly independent countries. They consequently espoused for total disarmament and peaceful settlement of disputes. Their support to the United Nations was "largely based on the hope that the world body is the only workable mechanism for peaceful settlement of international disputes ...".<sup>9</sup>

Another concomitant factor was the craving for security among the newly independent countries which made them pursue a policy of non-alignment. The cold war posed greatest threat to the security of the small and weak countries. The super power rivalry had accentuated this sense of insecurity. The newly independent countries which happened to be adjacent to the communist powers were especially subjected to this kind of pressure from both the blocs due to their strategic importance. Under these cir-

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8. Leo Mates, n.4, p. 57.

9. Nair, n.5, p. 30.

cumstance, non-alignment with both the blocs was thus found to be the best possible guarantee by these countries to preserve their national integrity and independence.

### EVOLUTION OF THE NAM

The emergence of the non-aligned movement was the result of the initiatives undertaken by the Asian Countries.<sup>10</sup> The leaders of Asia were quite aware of the revolutionary changes that were going on to dominate the international politics after the Second World War.<sup>11</sup> Cecil V. Crabb opines that the doctrine of diplomatic non-alignment arose due to in response to a particular act of historical circumstance and causations.<sup>12</sup>

India is credited with making the first official announcement of the policy of non-alignment in September

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10. P. Worsely, "Revolution in the Third World", New Left Review, November-December 1961, p. 19.

11. T.N. Das, "India, Past, Present and Future", Political Science Quarterly, June, 1947, p. 205.

12. C.V. Crabb, The Elephants and the Grass : A Study of Non-alignment (New York, 1965), p. 198.

1946.<sup>13</sup> The essentials like peace anti-colonialism, anti-racialism non-alignment with power blocs support to Afro-Asian solidarity and faith in the United Nations which now constitute the basic premises of the policy of non-alignment were also elaborated by Nehru a few days later.<sup>14</sup>

Like India, another Asian country Burma also pioneered the cause of non-alignment. Owing to serious internal troubles, Burma could not devote full attention to foreign affairs during the early years of its independence, but there were firm assertions even during these turbulent years that provided definite indications of an independent foreign policy. The Burmese premier said in 1949 that "of the three great western powers, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR ... APPL<sup>15</sup> wish that Burma should be in friendly relations with all the three."<sup>16</sup> In 1950, the Prime Minister of Burma emphati-

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13. Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence and After (Delhi, 1949), p. 340.

14. N.N. Mitra, (ed.) Indian Annual Register, September 1946, Vol. II (Calcutta, 1946), pp. 251-58.

15. The APPL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League) was the major nationalist organization in Burma and was the ruling party at that time.

16. Speech by the Burmese Prime Minister, Thakin Nu on 13 June 1948, Towards Peace and Democracy (Rangoon, Government Printing Press, 1948), p. 117.

cally declared that Burma did not desire "alignment with a particular power bloc antagonistic to other opposing bloc."<sup>17</sup> By 1950 other Asian countries like Indonesia and Sri Lanka had also declared the pursuance of the policy of non-alignment as the basis of their foreign policy.

A significant addition to this non-aligned group of Asian countries during this period was Yugoslavia. The factors contributing for Yugoslavia's pursuit of the policy of non-alignment were to a large extent different from those of the Asian countries. Until its rifts with the Soviet Union in 1948, Belgrade formed part of the communist bloc. But after its rift with the communist bloc, instead of aligning with the western bloc, Yugoslavia preferred to pursue an independent foreign policy. It was under these circumstances that countries like India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and later Egypt not only made non-alignment as the bed rock of their respective foreign policies but helped in furthering this movement. The Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 and in January 1949 and the Bandung Conference held in 1955 provided the background as well as the basis for the NAM which manifested itself at the first Non-aligned Summit held at Bel-

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17. Speech by Prime Minister Thakin Nu on 19 July, 1950. From Peace to Stability (Rangoon, Government Printing Press, 1950), p. 86.



grade in 1961 and its dynamism is discernible from the fact that its strength has grown from summit to summit.

(d) Asian Relations Conference

In March 1947, a conference of Asian countries was held in New Delhi at the initiative of India's Interim Government through non-official channels. Most of the Asian countries including India represented at the conference were yet to attain complete independence. In all 28 countries participated in this conference. They included some of the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union as well as Tibet. The Arab League sent an observer to the conference. India had convened the conference "with the dual purpose of bringing about climate of cooperation among the emerging nations of renaissance Asia and probing the grounds on which they might cooperate with each other."<sup>18</sup>

Nehru in his speech praised the new spirit of re-surgent Asia and said that in New Asia "there are no leaders and no followers, in this atomic age Asia would have to play her part in securing peace in "one world."<sup>19</sup> Though still under British colonial yoke, when the conference was

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18. Gandhijee Roy, The Non-aligned Diplomacy of Mrs Indira Gandhi (Patna, 1983), p. 68.

19. G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London), 1966, p. 54.

held, India could focus attention on global problems. It played a notable role in rallying the support of independent Asian countries in the field of international politics. Malaysia and Sri Lanka were critical of India and China, as well as the Indian and Chinese constituents, of their local population. Such sentiments were echoed at the conference but India played it cool.

Though the Asian Relations Conference of March 1947 failed to achieve any substantial gain either from the super powers or among themselves. Yet it was recognised as a first step towards consolidating the newly independent countries of Asia. According to G.H. Jansen, Asian Relations Conference was not more than a large grin without a cheshire cat attached.<sup>20</sup> However, this conference sowed the seed of the non-aligned diplomacy because it was the first conference of the non-aligned Asian countries.<sup>21</sup> It was for the first time that free and independent countries of Asia, had gathered together to discuss their mutual problems and share their concern over global issues with their neighbours and other friendly countries.

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20. Ibid., p. 74.

21. Gandhijee Roy, n. 18, p. 68.

The successful holding of the Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 has alarmed the western media. News Chronicle of London wrote that "a certain nervousness has been apparent in European capitals lest some conspiracy for an anti-western bloc was being hatched; nothing is farther from the minds of those sponsoring the conference."<sup>22</sup> The New York Times warned that "the western world will do well to watch carefully what is happening in New Delhi since it may envisage large potentialities."<sup>23</sup> The Times was even more minority : "the world has a new force to reckon with the awakened spirit of Asia."<sup>24</sup>

Within a year succeeding the Asian Relations Conference in March 1947, most of the countries in Asia became independent. In August 1947, India and Pakistan attained independence. In January 1948 Burma and in February 1948, Sri Lanka became independent.

Indonesia was still struggling for independence from the Dutch colonial yoke. India convened a second conference of the Asian Powers in January 1949 to consi-

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22. New Chronicle (London), 25 March, 1947.

23. New York Times (New York), 27 March, 1947.

24. The Times (London), 26 March, 1947.

der the question of Indonesian independence. The immediate problem warranting urgent attention was to come to the rescue, of Indonesia in its struggle to preserve its freedom against the Dutch attempt to re-impose their colonial hold.

The second Asian Conference was different from the conference of 1947. It was attended by only 20 countries. Neither the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union nor Vietnam was invited. The plea taken by the various participating countries was that only such countries which were recognised internationally as being sovereign should be invited. About one third members of the United Nations were represented in this conference. These countries voiced their common concern about Indonesia's independence.

India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru said in his inaugural address:

We meet today because the freedom of a sister of ours has been imperilled and the dying colonialism of the past has raised its head again and challenged all the forces that are struggling to build up a new structure of the world ... It was a challenge to a newly awakened Asia which so long suffered under various forms of colonialism ... if this challenge is not met effectively then, indeed, the consequences will affect not merely Indonesia but Asia and the entire world.<sup>25</sup>

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25. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. I, September, 1945-May 1949, second edition (New Delhi, 1958), p. 326. (Hereafter Nehru's Speeches, Vol. I).

The conference was held in such an atmosphere charged with heavy emotions that many feared that it might result in the emergence of an anti-colonial Asian bloc. Washington and London feared such a consummation and expressed their anxieties to India through their embassies.<sup>26</sup> However, the participants, especially India were convinced that Asian bloc simply based on anti-colonial sentiments was bound to yield no positive gains.

The conference adopted three resolutions. The first resolution was critical of the Dutch action and called for the action by the United Nations. The second urged the representative of the participating countries in the UN to consult among themselves on the issue. The participating countries were called upon by the third resolution, to consult each other for finding ways and means establishing an appropriate machinery for promoting cooperation within the frame-work of the United Nations.<sup>27</sup> Though the third resolution envisaged a possibility for the future integration of Asia, yet it could not yield to persuasion.<sup>28</sup>

26. For details see, L.K. Rosinger, India and the United States (New York, 1950), pp. 86-100.

27. Sisir Gupta, Indian and Regional Integration in Asia (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1964), p. 40.

28. See Werner Levi, Free India in Asia (Minnesota, 1954), p. 42.

Thus there was no plan to forge an Asian bloc. It was evident that the free and sovereign countries of Asia were eager to consult each other in resolving the mutual problems and unitedly opposed colonialism. The successful convening of the Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 and then in January 1949 had proved it.

### Bandung Conference

As we have seen in the preceding pages, the Asian Relations Conference proved the desire and determination of Asian countries to pursue the policy of non-alignment. But the mid-1950s, many countries in Africa had also attained independence. The independent and sovereign countries of Asia and Africa were invited to an Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung in Indonesia in April 1955.

The Bandung Conference, where 29 countries were represented, captured the contemporary imagination first and foremost by its size. The primary initiative for Bandung Conference came from Indonesia's Prime Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, who "persuaded his counterparts in the loose association known as the 'Colombo Powers' an informal grouping of Burma, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Indonesia jointly to sponsor a meeting of Asian and African Government."<sup>29</sup>

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29. Robert A. Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics (New York, 1980), p. 7.

The purpose of the conference was envisaged in general terms:

to promote goodwill and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa ... to consider social, economic and cultural problems ... to consider problems of special interest ... racialism and colonialism ... to view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.<sup>30</sup>

Though it was hastily defined, but the vague hope that such a meeting might enhance the place of the new states in the global system was sufficient to get things started;

In February 1951, Nehru had visualised the proposed Afro-Asian Conference "as a curious assortment of the countries of Asia and Africa."<sup>31</sup> The sponsoring powers declared that the basic purpose of the conference was to have the participants getting acquainted with one another's point of view and that a participating power would not be supposed to be committed to any view held at the conference against its own wishes.<sup>32</sup>

30. George Mc Turnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 3.

31. Nehru's Speech in Lok Sabha, see Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. I, Part II, 1955, cols. 520-1.

32. See for details M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs 1954-56, Asia Publishing House, Bombay (1964), pp. 201-213.

India's role in the conference was determined by two major factors. It was India's desire to envisage a climate of peace, cooperation and unity in Asia and Africa, and thereby, to establish the impact of Asia and Africa on international politics. By doing so, India was resolved to discourage continentalism, political or racial.<sup>33</sup> Though it was also aware of the fact that the common urge guiding Asian-African cooperation lay in the resentment to the supremacy in world held by the West.<sup>34</sup> India also aimed at enlarging the area of peace by practising and popularising the principles of Panchsheel.<sup>35</sup>

The Conference envisaged the principles for economic and cultural cooperation of the dependent peoples, by preserving their rights for self-determination and peace. It suggested to establish a special U.N. Fund for Asian-African countries. It called for elimination of colonialism with a view to envisage political liberation of the dependent people. It also affirmed respect for fundamental human rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity of

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33. Nehru's Speech, n.25.

34. Tibor Mende, Conversations with Mr Nehru (London, 1956), pp. 62-63.

35. Nehru's Speech, n. 25.



all nations, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries etc. These principles now constitutes the bases of non-alignment.

India played a notable role in furthering the message and spirit of the Bandung Conference. It displayed a remarkable determination to see the conference result in common agreements. Colonialism was of the two major controversial issues,<sup>36</sup> causing division in the conference. All participating countries were opposed to the classic colonialism. As most of the countries opposed western colonialism, countries like Sri Lanka wanted opposition to be voiced against Soviet Imperialism. India did not share this view for it regarded the East European countries as being sovereign in law and practice and could not be held to be under colonial domination.<sup>37</sup> Though India found it hard to get other participating countries to agree to its view point but at the same time it played significant role, in getting the conference agree on declaring colonialism, in all its manifestation, as an evil.

Another bitter fight at the Conference was provoked by the speech made by Pakistan's Prime Minister on

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36. A Appadorai, "The Bandung Conference", India Quarterly (New Delhi), Vol. 3, July-September 1955, pp. 223-31.

37. D.N. Malik, Development of Non-Alignment in India's Foreign Policy (Allahabad, 1967), p. 175.

April 22, wherein he claimed during discussion on the question of promotion of world peace and cooperation that the principles of peaceful co-existence and even the United Nations Organisation did not sufficiently guarantee the sovereignty, independence and security of the smaller countries and they were therefore forced to resort to great powers' aid and union for the sake of their own security. In his reply, Nehru stated that "the so-called realistic appreciation of the world situation" had actually led the world to the brink of a third world war. He pointed out that if the Asian and African countries remained non-aligned with either bloc, they might be in a position to tilt the balance of strength in favour of peace. "If all the world were to be divided up between these two big blocs, what would be the result? The inevitable result would be war."<sup>38</sup> Referring to the right to individual or collective self-defence which the Prime Minister of Pakistan had been trying to get the conference to approve, Nehru said that he did not deny this right, any more than the right to join military pacts, like Pakistan, but he strongly objected to the conference being asked to approve it. Referring to the Turkish delegate's defence of NATO, Nehru said that bloc had become "one of the most powerful protectors of Colonialism."<sup>39</sup>

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38. M.S. Rajan, n.32, p. 207.

39. Ibid.,

India's Panchsheel principles were highly acclaimed by the Bandung powers.

Besides five principles of Panchsheel or peaceful co-existence, some new items were added to the first five principles of Nehru's Panchsheel making a total of ten points.<sup>40</sup> Nehru hailed the Bandung declaration as confirming the Panchsheel and contributing to the "area of peace." India felt satisfied on the fact that the success of the conference left its impact on world politics and enhanced the prospects of significant rise in the importance of Asia and Africa in the United Nations.<sup>41</sup> It was at this conference that the concept of non-alignment was fully expounded and a new dimension given to it.

The ten principles of non-alignment adopted by the participating countries of the Bandung Conference enabled each country to base its relations with other countries on the principles of peaceful co-existence irrespective of differences in their social, economic and political systems and level of developments.

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40. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 4, Part 2, 1955, Col.6970.

41. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, March 1953-August 1957 (New Delhi, 1958), p. 291. See also Richard I. Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, Washington, 1961, pp. 24-51.

The policy of Panchsheel gathered strength in the world and many countries commended it as worthy of universal respect. After the conference more and more adherents were found for the policy of non-alignment, various countries realised the soundness of the concept and began to take interest in spreading and strengthening it. Jawaharlal Nehru, Nasser and Tito became the beacon lights for non-alignment in Asia-Africa and Europe respectively and formed the triumvirate of non-alignment. Thus the policy of non-alignment became a movement spearheaded by the three leaders. They conducted the crusade for the achievement of world peace not by dividing the world into power blocs, but by enlarging the area of peace "Freedom", mutual cooperation and by the elimination of colonialism, racialism from the surface of the world. The growing club of non-aligned countries then felt the need for a common forum for promoting mutual consultation at regular intervals. The summit conference that began in 1961 provided such a forum.

#### India's Role in the NAM

Non-alignment constitutes one of the basic tenets of India's foreign policy. The evolution of India's policy of non-alignment is identified with Jawaharlal Nehru. A.K. Damodaran opines that "the idea of non-alignment from power

blocs, as distinct from the earlier concepts of neutrality or the later pejorative phrase 'neutrality' is associated both in its origin and in its evolution with Jawaharlal Nehru along with three or four leaders."<sup>42</sup> However, Nehru denied being the originator of the policy of non-alignment when he said on 9 December 1958: "I have not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom and inherent in the circumstances of the world today."<sup>43</sup> Though Nehru might not have fathered the concept of non-aligned movement but he played the most significant role in its evolution and proliferation.

#### India's Foreign Policy and Non-Alignment

It has been described in the preceding pages that non-alignment emerged as the basic level of foreign policy in post-independent India. India's role in the Asian Relations Conference of March 1947 and January 1949 and at the Bandung Conference which laid foundations for the NAM has been analysed in the preceding pages. India's pursuit

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42. A.K. Damodaran, "Jawaharlal Nehru and Non-alignment" in Uma Vasudev, (ed.), Issues Before Non-alignment (New Delhi, 1983), p. 48.

43. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi, 1961), p. 80.

of the policy of non-alignment is briefly analysed in the context of leading events up to the holding of the First NAM Summit at Belgrade in September 1961.

India's destiny in foreign relations had already been cast by Jawaharlal Nehru's statement of 7 September 1946 when he said that India would keep away from the politics of power blocs. This statement was made by Nehru when India had yet to attain its independence. Consequently upon India attaining independence on 15 August 1947, the non-alignment became the main bulwark of India's foreign policy.

Non-alignment promoted internal stability and externally it enhanced India's prestige in the international community. It also did not escalate the "political schizophrenia",<sup>44</sup> in the minds of the people. It rather envisaged conditions conducive for the political stability. India's relations with almost all the countries have remained cordial. Even with Pakistan and China where certain differences do exist because of various reasons, India has always sought friendship and settlement of dispute by peaceful means.

India played a pivotal role in espousing the cause of unity and cooperation in Asia. It also helped in streng-

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44. Frank Moraes, Nehru : A Biography (New York, 1959), p. 402.

thening the NAM. It never aspired to be the leader of Asia. Yet its geographical situation in the continent<sup>45</sup> was destined to offer leadership to India. Sikkim was converted into protectorate<sup>46</sup> and Bhutan acquired a special status<sup>47</sup> and Nepal wanted simply patronisation.<sup>48</sup> India forged close and friendly relations with Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia which also needed mutual confidence.<sup>49</sup>

Despite the criticism, of its policy in India and abroad, India continued its commitment to the policy of non-alignment. As we have seen in the preceding pages the newly independent countries of Asia affirmed their faith in the policy of non-alignment and were mainly inspired by the example of India. The successful convening of the two Asian Relations Conferences and the Bandung Conference were proof of this.

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45. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

46. Sikkim was merged into the Indian Union in 1974.

47. See, the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty of 8 August 1949, Foreign Policy of India - Text of Documents (2nd edn.), (New Delhi, 1950), pp. 15-19.

48. Hindu (Madras), 29 September, 1946.

49. Ibid., 9 January, 1947.

Korean Crisis:

But India remained silent for about a year in order to gain Chinese support for envisaging peace and cooperation in Asia. At the same time India was reluctant to accept the recommendations of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly where it was resolved that China's non-acceptance of the Arab-Asian resolution on cease-fire ended the prospects of negotiation on Korea.<sup>50</sup> Nehru nursed the hope of restoring the atmosphere with alternative proposals. However, subsequently India supported the UN resolution on Korea. Its representative at the UN Security Council had voted in favour of the first resolution of 25 June.<sup>51</sup> While supporting the second resolution, India said that mediation over the Korean crisis was possible. U.K. and China were informed by New Delhi of its own suggestion towards clearing the atmosphere for mediation.<sup>52</sup> At the same time, India was opposed to North Korean representative being invited to the Security Council because the latter was the aggressor.<sup>53</sup> "All this

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50. United Nations (UN), Official Records of General Assembly (hereafter GAOR), First Committee, 1951, 419th Meeting, Col. 459.

51. Official Records of the Security Council (hereafter SCOR) 1950, 473rd Meeting, p. 16. Also see, B. Shiva Rao, "Nehru and the UN-I", The Statesman (Calcutta) 7 December, 1965.

52. K.M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas (London, 1955), pp.105-6.

53. SCOR, 1950, 483rd Meeting, p. 11.



therefore, may lead to infer that what motivated India to be prompt in holding North Korea an aggressor was its desire to demonstrate that the pacific import of its non-alignment did not mean appeasing the aggressor and that here non-alignment clearly contrasted with neutrality."<sup>54</sup>

In the period prior to the Korean war, neither the East nor West regarded the policy of non-alignment seriously. It was viewed as nothing more than "a verbal exercise."<sup>55</sup> Under the Truman Doctrine, the United States had declared its policy of global containment of the communism. China and Asian portion of Russia became the main anchor sheets of US's Asian policy. By mid-1950s, the United States had succeeded in creating a large network of alliances involving as many as 42 countries.<sup>56</sup> This had led the Soviet Union and other East European countries to expand their network of alliances thus resulting in the escalation of cold war.

Unlike Pakistan, India could not be entrapped by Washington into its military alliance system. India's

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54. Malik, n.38, p. 84.

55. Charles H. Heimsath, "Non-Alignment Re-assessed: The Experience of India" in R. Hilsman and R.C. Sood (eds.), Foreign Policies in the Sixties, (Baltimore, 1963), p.49.

56. For details see David Kimche , The Afro-Asian Movement : Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World (New York, 1973), p. 59.

policy of non-alignment, by thus, had crystallized.<sup>57</sup> India's reluctance to join the American sponsored military alliances annoyed the US and it offered Pakistan an opportunity to befriend of the United States and accept her alliance policy so that she could contain India.<sup>58</sup>

The strategic planners in Washington were of the view that in order to contain communism in South and South-East Asia, the Asian countries had to be brought under an alliance system modelled on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Eventually on 8 September 1954 the countries of South and South-East Asia and USA signed the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).<sup>59</sup> In 1955, United States sponsored another treaty organization known as Baghdad Pact which was renamed as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).<sup>60</sup> Pakistan joined both SEATO and CENTO because its strategic location provided a link between SEATO and CENTO.

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57. A Appadorai, Essays in Indian Politics and Foreign Policy, (Delhi, 1971), p. 146.

58. John Muttam, US-Pakistan and India : A Study of US Role in the India Pakistan Arms Race (New Delhi, 1974), p. 35.

59. For full text of the Treaty see, Documents on American Foreign Relations 1954 (Washington, 1955), pp. 319-23.

60. For the text of CENTO treaty, see, ibid., (1956), pp. 342-44.

Pakistan's strategy of joining these military alliances was not governed by the fear of "communist aggression", but because of its fear from a non-aligned India. President Ayub Khan who played a leading role in Pakistan's alignment with SEATO and CENTO, wrote that "the cause of the problem from the very beginning was the Indian attitude of hostility towards us; we had to look for allies to secure our position."<sup>61</sup> He further asserted that his interest was exclusively in terms of the defence of Pakistan and he wanted to take the advantage of such defence pacts to build up the defence forces of Pakistan.<sup>62</sup> Thus the main motive of Pakistan's joining these alliances was the result of its extreme pathological anti-India stance. Pakistan also signed the Mutual Defence Agreement Pact (MDAP) on 19 May 1954 with the United States.<sup>63</sup> These arrangements paved the way for inflow of American arms into Pakistan on a very modest scale from 1954 which increased rapidly in subsequent years.

India rejected the bipolar division of the world. It pursued an independent policy of keeping away from the

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61. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Master (Lahore, 1967), p. 154.

62. Ibid., p. 116.

63. For full text see, Documents on American Foreign Relations, pp. 379-83.

military alliances and judge every issue on the basis of its merits. This formed the pitch and substance of India's policy of non-alignment.<sup>64</sup> Pakistan's intention of joining the U.S. Defence Alliance was viewed by India as a serious development which could endanger the security of the sub-continent thus marring the chances of any settlement by peaceful means. Nehru warned that the MDAP would change the situation in the Indian sub-continent. He forewarned in a statement on 22 February 1954 that the "step adds to the feeling of insecurity in Asia. It is, therefore, a wrong step from point of view of peace and removal of tensions."<sup>65</sup> He had even visualized that US arms supplied to Pakistan were not going to be used against the communist countries but against India. While addressing the 59th Session of the Congress on 23 February 1954 Nehru said: "If Pakistan accepts this aid, she becomes a part of the group of nations lined up against another group. She becomes potentially a war area and her policies will be progressively controlled by others ... The other fact that - this military aid might possibly be used

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64. K.R. Narayana, "New Perspectives on Indian Foreign Policy", The Round Table (London), No.248, October 1972, p. 453.

65. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. I, No. 6 (1954), Col. 432.

against India - cannot be ignored."<sup>66</sup> Unfortunately Nehru did not live to see his prophecy came true in 1965 and 1971.

It is worth mentioning here that at a time when India's own security was endangered, owing to Pakistan's joining of the US sponsored military alliances, it did not deviate from its chosen path of non-alignment and rather pursued this policy more vigorously. It was a testing for India's commitment to the policy of non-alignment which it steered successfully.

It seems suffice here to say that India played a notable role in furthering the cause of non-alignment. Even at the time of crisis in which it was directly involved. The policy of non-alignment became the main bulwark of India's foreign policy. India's exemplary role and its commitment to the NAM principles inspired other countries. India's role in the non-aligned summit conferences is analysed in subsequent chapters.

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66. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), Vol. 9 (1953-54), pp. 134-61.

### Chapter III

#### INDIA'S ROLE AT THE FIRST SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES (BELGRADE, SEPTEMBER 1961)

The first Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned countries was held at Belgrade (Yugoslavia) from 1-6 September 1961. This Conference was attended by Heads of State or Government of the 25 countries and three countries were represented as observers.<sup>1</sup> The non-aligned participating countries were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

The following countries were represented by observers: Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador.

The agenda of the Summit Conference comprised:

- (i) Exchange of views on the International situation.
- (ii) Establishment and strengthening of International peace and security:
  - (a) Respect of the right of peoples and nations to self-determination, struggle against imperialism;
  - (b) Respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States; non-interference and non-intervention in internal affairs of States;

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1. Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961-1978 (hereafter NAM documents) (Belgrade, 1978), p. 5.

- (c) Racial discrimination and apartheid;
  - (d) general and complete disarmament; banning of nuclear tests; problem of foreign military bases.
  - (e) Peaceful co-existence among States with different political and social systems;
  - (f) Role and structure of the United Nations and the implementation of its resolutions.
- (iii) Problems of unequal economic development; promotion of international economic and technical co-operation;
- (iv) Other matters.
- (v) Communique of the conference.

(a) Background to the Summit

The first summit of the non-aligned countries was held at Belgrade from 1-6 September 1961. Prior to this, a preparatory meeting of the representatives of the non-aligned countries was held at Cairo (Egypt) from 5-12 June 1961 under the Chairmanship of Egyptian Foreign Minister, Dr Mahmoud Fawzi, not to establish an organization or formulate a constitution or a charter for the non-aligned movement but to adopt certain principles.

Peter Willetts opines that there were three main reasons for holding the first summit at Belgrade: 'the close relations between Yugoslavia, Egypt and India; the dramatic impact of the African states on world affairs in 1960; and a sudden increase in tension after hopes had

been raised for an easing in the cold war.<sup>2</sup>

This conference, the 'first concerted action of the non-aligned countries'<sup>3</sup> was initiated under the conviction that non-alignment has become a growing force in the world and that time has now come to gather this force together to turn it into a coordinated accumulated moral force.<sup>4</sup> The first suggestion for arranging such a summit conference was reportedly mooted by Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia in the year 1959.<sup>5</sup>

During the late 1950s and till 1960, the wave of independence had swept across the African continent. In 1960, sixteen nations of Africa had become independent and joined the United Nations. At the same time, the problem of apartheid in South Africa had started getting the world attention focussed on it. The crisis in Congo and guerrilla war in Algeria had brought the 'cold war' into the heart of Africa. The experiences in the Congo and Algeria led Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana to sound the idea of a

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2. Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance, (Bombay, 1978), p. 10.
  3. Belgrade Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (Belgrade, 1961), p. 17.
  4. Indonesian President Soekarno's Speech at Belgrade Conference, ibid., p. 25.
  5. K.P. Karunakaran, "Background to the Neutral Nations' Summit", USI Journal (New Delhi), Vol. LXXXX, p. 175.



conference of all non-aligned countries particularly of Asia and Africa on 4 July 1960.<sup>6</sup>

However, the independent countries of Africa which were 26 in 1960, were divided into two groups - Brazzaville Group<sup>7</sup> and the Casablanca Group.<sup>8</sup> The Brazzaville group was apprehensive of Nkrumah's campaign for Pan-Africanism. Egypt, because of its geographical situation, is both an African as well as Arab country. Nasser had already been in close touch with Nehru and Tito, and was regularly 'consulting them on all the major problems of those times.'<sup>9</sup> The Casablanca group under the leadership of Nkrumah and Nasser supported the move for a meet of the non-aligned countries. The fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly was also due in September 1960. The meeting of the Casablanca group members in January 1961 stressed the need for a get-together of the non-aligned countries.

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6. D.N. Malik, "Belgrade: New Phase", in K.P. Karunakaran, ed., Outside the Contest (New Delhi, 1963), p. 189.

7. Brazzaville Group comprised ex-French Colonies of Africa.

8. Casablanca Group consisted of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and Egypt. The Provisional Government of Algeria was also its full member.

9. M. Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London, Mentor Paperbacks, 1973), Chapters VIII and IX are of special interest, pp. 80-110.

In March 1961, Indonesian President, Soekarno sent letters to Heads of other governments suggesting a Bandung type get-together which could include newly independent countries who 'support the liquidation of colonialism and imperialism in the shortest possible time.'<sup>10</sup>

The third factor instrumental in calling the Belgrade summit was the increase in the cold war tensions. In 1959 following the visit of Soviet Premier Khrushchev to the United States, hopes were raised for convening a summit conference of big powers, including Britain and France, in May 1960 at Paris. But the shooting down of U-2 spy plane by the Soviet Union in early 1960 and the furore over this affair brought the collapse of such a summit. The crises over Berlin and Congo further marred the prospects of detente between the big powers. However, there was no support from the big powers for convening an international meet outside the United Nations to find out ways and means for easing the cold war tensions. But the leaders of the non-aligned countries like Tito, Nasser, Nehru and Soekarno had not lost the hope. As mentioned above, Soekarno had already called for second Bandung type meeting in April 1961. However Nehru was less enthusiastic for, according to him, such a conference at the moment was 'likely to re-

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10. Soekarno quoted in Malik, n.6, p. 190.

sult in the show of disunity than unity.<sup>11</sup>

As the leaders of the non-aligned countries were attending the fifteenth session of the UN General Assembly, in September 1960, Yugoslavia is reported to have called a meeting of Tito, Nasser, Nehru, Nkrumah and Seokarno at the Yugoslavia's permanent mission at the UN, New York. Both the Egyptians and the Yugoslavs have referred to this meeting as the first non-aligned meeting.<sup>12</sup>

These five leaders had agreed to jointly sponsor a simple resolution calling upon both Soviet Union and the United States to review their contacts interrupted recently.<sup>13</sup> There was no enthusiastic response either from the West or the East. Finally Nehru withdrew the resolution, as it no longer had much meaning or usefulness.<sup>14</sup>

In the wake of impending impasse, Marshal Tito undertook a long tour of Africa from 13 February to 23

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11. Nehru quoted in Guardian, (Manchester), 10 May 1961.

12. See, The UAR and the Policy of Non-Alignment (Cairo, UAR State Information Service, n.d.), p. 22. See also Documents, Activity of Non-Aligned Countries, (Belgrade, n.d.), p. 1. Leo Mates claims that the meeting was held at the Yugoslavia's permanent mission at the UN, New York. See Leo Mates, Non-Alignment: Theory and Current Policy, (Belgrade, 1972), p. 228.

13. UN Official Records of the General Assembly (hereafter GAOR), 15th Session, Plenary Meetings, p. 289. See also UN Doc. A/4522.

14. Peter Willetts, n.2, p. 12.

April 1961 to promote the idea of holding a conference of the non-aligned countries. When Tito met Nasser in April 1961 the latter showed keen interest in Tito's proposal. Both Tito and Nasser were 'so anxious and so determined to hold this conference that they at length decided to ignore Nehru', who was still reluctant to that idea.<sup>15</sup>

During the last week of April a joint communique issued by Tito and Nasser appealed to the leaders of non-aligned countries proposing the conference and suggesting therein that it had to be so organised as to have 'a salutary effect' on the UN General Assembly meeting in its sixteenth session in September 1961.<sup>16</sup>

An invitation to a preparatory conference to be held at Cairo to arrange the main conference was issued on 26 April 1961. Following this fait accompli India had to support the idea and asked that its name should be joined to those of the original sponsors.<sup>17</sup>

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15. G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, (London, 1966), p. 280.

16. For full text of the communique, see Arab Observer, (Cairo), Vol. II, No. 20, 14 May 1961, pp. 14-15.

17. There are a few references to the first official diplomatic initiative for having issued invitations for a Non-Aligned Conference having been mooted by Tito and Nasser. The date 26 April 1961 is given in the Synopsis of the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, (Cairo, Information Department, n.d.), p.viii. G.H. Jansen refers to a period about a week later than 22 April 1961. See Jansen, n. 15, p. 281.

On 16 May 1961, an announcement and an invitation from President Tito, Nasser and Soekarno, envisaged that a preparatory meeting for a non-aligned conference would meet in Cairo on 5 June 1961 to be followed by a main conference held sometime before the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.<sup>18</sup> India wanted the proposed conference to be primarily concerned with problems of international relations relating to war and peace.<sup>19</sup>

(b) Preparatory Meeting for the Belgrade Conference

A preparatory meeting for the conference of the Non-Aligned Nations took place at Cairo from 5 to 12 June 1961 in response to an invitation of President Tito of Yugoslavia, President Nasser of Egypt and President Soekarno of Indonesia, who were joined by the Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru of India.<sup>20</sup>

Originally 22 countries were to attend it, but only 20 of them actually attended it. There prevailed a

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18. Jansen, n.15, pp. 281-82.

19. D.N. Malik, n.6, p. 191.

20. NAM Documents, n. 1, p. 3.

difference of opinion on a number of issues discussed by the meeting. Of the eight items on the agenda for the meeting, the composition of the conference, seating of the Algerian Provisional Government and Stanleyville Government of Congo at the preparatory meeting and drafting of the conference agenda were the most important. Ghana's proposal to invite the Algerian Provisional Government and the Stanleyville Government of Congo really sparked off the controversy. Some of the participating countries which had not recognized the Algerian Provisional Government opposed latter's membership. However, after long discussions the Provisional Government of Algeria was admitted to the meeting on the third day.

The preparatory meeting failed to finalise the composition of the conference, however, it evolved broad principles. A five point "definition" of non-alignment was drawn up on the basis of which the list of participants was to be worked out. The task of choosing the invitees was, however, left to the Committee of Ambassadors of the 20 countries.

The criterion worked out on the basis of the five points as the "definition" of a non-aligned country was as follows:

- (1) The country should be pursuing an independent policy based on non-alignment and peaceful co-existence;

- (ii) It should support anti-colonial liberation movement;
- (iii) It should not be member of the military pacts in the context of East-West struggle;
- (iv) It should not be a member of a bilateral military pact with a big power;
- (v) It should grant no military bases to foreign powers.<sup>21</sup>

The five-point definition of non-alignment was 'a compromise between the moderates and the militants'.<sup>22</sup>

The participants in the meeting also discussed suggestions for the agenda of the Conference. Although the Conference itself was to workout its own agenda, the participants in the preparatory meeting recommended a draft agenda so as to held the participating countries. The recommended agenda was as follows:

- (i) Respect of the right to peoples and nations to self-determination; the struggle against imperialism; liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism;
- (ii) Respect of the territorial sovereignty and integrity of states; non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states;
- (iii) Racial discrimination and apartheid;

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21. Statesman, (New Delhi), 12 June 1961.

22. D.N. Malik, n. 6, p. 193.

- (iv) General and complete disarmament, prohibition of nuclear experiments; problem of foreign military bases;
- (v) Peaceful co-existence between states with different political and social system;
- (vi) Role and composition of the United Nations and the implementation of its resolutions; problems of unequal economic development; improvement of international economic and technical cooperation.<sup>23</sup>

As regards the five-point definition of a non-aligned country, India espoused for a flexible definition capable of maximum accommodation. India argued against the Non-Aligned being a relatively small coherent exclusive group and proposed that many more countries should be invited to the full summit conference.<sup>24</sup>

India further pleaded that it was more profitable to keep the definition very broad-based at this stage of the growth of non-alignment. It argued that certain countries which had involuntarily become party to military pacts with their previous colonial masters were politically non-aligned.<sup>25</sup> India further opined that the newly independent countries had to continue with the old economic ties they

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23. "Official Communiqué on the Preparation for the Belgrade Conference", NAM Documents, n. 1, p. 3.

24. Peter Willetts, n.2, p. 13.

25. Adopted from D.N. Malik, n. 6, pp. 193-94.



had with the former colonial powers and these countries had, therefore, to cooperate with them out of necessity. Besides the newly independent countries were having military bases as a condition to the attainment of their independence. It also expressed the view that quite a considerable number of Latin American and European neutralist countries could contribute to the expansion of the area of non-alignment.<sup>26</sup>

The final communique of the meeting observed that the 'zone of non-alignment could be further extended both from the view-point of activity and of influence, with the aim of transforming it into a base factor for the preservation of international peace and security'.<sup>27</sup> It also expressed the conviction that 'with the holding of such a conference, positive results could be achieved in the interests of world peace, effective international cooperation, and the realization of the aspirations of millions of people for independence and a better and happier future.'<sup>28</sup>

The participating countries at the preparatory meeting affirmed 'their loyalty to the policy of non-alignment as a method of approaching positively the problems

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26. Ibid.

27. Nam Documents, n.1, p. 3.

28. Ibid.

which confront the world'.<sup>29</sup> All the participating countries agreed that the Conference of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries should be held in Yugoslavia in early September 1961.

The First NAM Summit Conference (Belgrade, 1-6 September 1961)

The preparatory meeting's task was quite historic in deciding the venue and time of the conference. Several choices for the prospective venue came up. The suggestive places included Havana, New Delhi, Belgrade, New York and even Stockholm. Cuba's suggestion that 'the conference be held at Havana as it was the centre of struggle against the US imperialism was practically ignored',<sup>30</sup> because the other non-aligned countries refused to take extreme positions. India itself did not favour New Delhi as the venue. Finally the consensus emerged in favour of Belgrade. The choice of the date - 1 September 1961 - manifested the common desire of all non-aligned nations to 'make the weight of their deliberations felt by the sixteenth session of the UN General Assembly',<sup>31</sup> which was scheduled to meet on 16 September 1961.

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29. Ibid.

30. D.N. Malik, n. 6, p. 196.

31. Ibid.

The 20-nation Ambassadors Committee which was constituted by the Preparatory Meeting to finalise the list of invitees for the Belgrade Conference, started work on 21 June 1961 at Cairo. This Committee was faced with the problem of how to interpret and apply the five-point definition of a non-aligned country. There was a general agreement among the Committee Members with regard to the further expansion of the non-aligned area. But there emerged a divergence of opinions as to how to do it. India and Burma had advocated the degree of flexibility and accommodation. But Cuba, Sri Lanka and Egypt were reluctant to envisage any dilution of principles on which non-alignment was based. As the consultations among the Ambassadors of the 20-nation committee were still going on, the committee realised that the term, 'neutralism' included positive neutralism, progressive neutralism, non-alignment, the uncommitted and the disengaged.<sup>32</sup> In order to avoid confusion and facilitate the smooth functioning of the committee, Jawaharlal Nehru in a personal letter addressed to Tito and Nasser stressed that it was not enough for the so-called neutralist

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32. Statesman, (New Delhi), 24 June 1961. The terms neutralism, non-alignment uncommitted as used in this paragraph denote the prevailing connotation of the term and not what it means today.

nations to be non-aligned to power-blocs but that they should be non-aligned among themselves.<sup>33</sup>

Tito in his reply to Nehru agreed that the Conference should be broad-based.<sup>34</sup> Consequently besides the 20 countries which participated in the preparatory meeting, 8 more countries were selected. These were: Lebanon, Bolivia, Ecuador, Togoland, Upper Volta, Nigeria, Mexico and Brazil. However, Togoland, Nigeria and Mexico did not accept the invitation.<sup>35</sup> Later Tunisia and Cyprus were invited to the Conference. Thus these 28 non-aligned countries all which had agreed to participate in the Belgrade Conference. Of 28, 25 were fullfledged participants and three opted to remain as observers.

Thus all the decks were cleared to organize the first summit conference of the non-aligned countries at Belgrade. It was organized from 1 to 6 September 1961. It was attended by 25 non-aligned countries and three countries sent observers.<sup>36</sup>

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33. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 28 July 1961.

34. The Hindu, (Madras), 8 August 1961.

35. Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 8 July 1961.


36. "Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Belgrade, 1-6 September 1961", NAM Documents, n.1, p. 5.

The countries participating in the Belgrade Conference represented above one-third of mankind and thus clearly demonstrated the thrust of non-alignment as a force to reckon within international affairs. It was very significant that the conference had the character of a summit - the fact that the majority of the countries were represented by their chief executives. Nehru, Tito, Nasser, Soekarno and Nkrumah were the dominating figures of the Conference.

(c) International Problems, Summit's Decisions and India's Role

The Belgrade Summit Conference was held in the background of an alarming intensification of international tension. Nehru felt impatient with those who continued to give top priority to colonial problems. He felt that this particular battle had been won already in essence and that only the details remained to be worked out; his own contribution to this working out of the details was the liberation of Goa. But an analysis of the speeches delivered at the conference reveals that there prevailed a difference of opinion in the views of the participating countries.

Jawaharlal Nehru attached top priority to the question of the threat to world peace and security emanating from the conflict between the two super powers on the



question of Berlin. India's view was shared by Yugoslavia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Burma, Ghana, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nepal, Ceylon, Cyprus, Somalia and Congo. Nehru while stressing on the inherent dangers from the impending war said:

... Imperialism, colonialism, racialism and the rest - things which are vitally important ... are somewhat overshadowed by this crisis (Berlin). For if war comes all else for the moment goes. Therefore, it becomes inevitable for us ... to make sure that the dominant role of our thinking and action and what we say and put down is this crisis that confronts the humanity.<sup>37</sup>

However, Indonesia laid stress on the elimination of imperialism and colonialism. The Indonesian view-point was supported by Sudan, Cuba, Tunisia, Cambodia, Morocco, Mali, Guinea and Algeria, Indonesian President, Soekarno, while elaborating this aspect, said:

Many problems demand immediate solution, and as long as we fail to get the source of the tension and strife we shall be working like amateur plumbers, plugging up a leak here only to find a bigger one spurting up behind our very backs, and another yet another. Prevailing world opinion would have us believe that the real source of international tension and strife is ideological conflict between the great powers. I think that is not true. There is the conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of domination.<sup>38</sup>

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37. Belgrade Conference, n. 3, pp. 107-8. See also Government of India Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. VII, No. 9, September 1961, p. 255.

38. Ibid., p. 27.

There is no exaggeration in saying that the Conference was greatly influenced by India's stand. All the participating countries also paid attention to the question of economic development of the under-developed countries. Yugoslavia, Bolivia, Cuba, Ethiopia and Guinea attached more significance to this problem. There was almost a consensus among the participating countries on the question of elevating and strengthening the non-aligned movement by linking it to the question of international peace and security.

But for the exceptions of Cuban criticism of the United States, Afro-Arab attacks on France, Yugoslav and Indonesian mild attack on the Soviet Union, the Conference on the whole, maintained remarkable balance by avoiding condemnation of either super power. It was evident from this that the non-alignment was capable of maintaining its intactness and judicious balance in assessing the delicate issues of a critical international situation.

Even the Soviet Union's decision to resume nuclear tests which coincided with the holding of the Belgrade Summit, could not envisage any substantial change in the situation. The western countries regarded the Soviet decision as "diplomacy of terror" and "atomic blackmail" designed both against the non-aligned countries and the western countries. The West regarded the attitude of

the non-aligned countries on Soviet announcement as 'act of timidity'.<sup>39</sup> This does not mean that the non-aligned countries were non-sensitive to such developments but the NAM countries displayed an extra-ordinary sense of objectivity in viewing this event in its correct perspective.<sup>40</sup>-- as an instance in a sequence of events.

The Belgrade Conference envisaged more deep and clear interpretation to the meaning of non-alignment. Every participating country expressed its views on it and most of the speeches were specifically devoted to explaining it. Thus the respective national outlooks and points of convergence and divergence on the meaning of the non-alignment among the non-aligned countries were discernible at this Conference.

Indonesian stand on non-alignment was rather comprehensive. As President Soekarno observed: 'Non-Alignment is active devotion to the lofty cause of independence, abiding peace, social justice, and the freedom to be free'<sup>41</sup> He said that non-alignment entailed a positive meaning and

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39. Robert Bendiner in New Statesman (London), Vol. LXII, 15 September 1961, pp. 330-31.

40. President Modibo Keita of Mali's statement on 15 September 1961 at New Delhi. See Hindustan Times, 17 September 1961.

41. Belgrade Conference, n.3, p. 27.



rejected the idea that being non-aligned means becoming a 'buffer state between the two giant blocs'.<sup>42</sup> While almost all the participating countries denied the mere passivity of non-alignment, Cambodia<sup>43</sup> struck a marked note of divergence from Seokarno's stand when Prince Sihanouk said:

Certain non-aligned friends perhaps consider that the fact of concerting to be a "buffer" ... between the two blocs is indicative of passive neutrality ... to be a buffer state is to be in the best position to bring about a reconciliation between our friends in the two blocs by eliminating the causes of friction as much as possible.<sup>44</sup>

While the participating countries agreed on the contents of non-alignment as "abiding peace", and "freedom to be free", which also means independent judgement of international issues, each on its own merit, Prime Minister Nehru attached more significance when he said:

... The word non-aligned may be differently interpreted but basically it was used and coined almost, with the meaning non-aligned with the great power blocs of the world. Non-aligned has a negative meaning, but if you give it a positive connotation it means nations which object to this lining up for war purposes, military blocs, military alliances and the like. Therefore, we keep away from this and we want to throw our

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42. Ibid.

43. Cambodia is now called Kampuchea.

44. Belgrade Conference, n.3, p. 188.

weight, such as it is, in favour of peace.<sup>45</sup>

The countries like Burma, Saudi Arabia, Cambodia and Ethiopia laid stress on the balance of impartiality in non-alignment. The Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia said that the 'non-alignment means that our souls must be innocent of any bias towards any bloc in dispute'.<sup>46</sup> Nehru while explaining the growth of non-alignment emphasised:

Some few years ago - six, seven or eight, if you like - this business of non-alignment was a rare phenomenon ... the whole course of history of the last few years has shown the growing an opinion, spread of this conception of non-alignment. Why is that so? Because it was in tune line with the course of events; it was in line tune with the thinking of the vast numbers of people whether the country concerned was non-aligned or not.<sup>47</sup>

The Indonesian President, Soekarno, explained his perception of non-alignment:

We each arrived at this policy inspired by common ideas, prompted by similar circumstances, spurred on by like-experiences. There was no attempt at compromise among us, no attempt to round off disagreements to make our policies identical. But not one of us, I think, will deny that we did inspire each other. The experiences of one

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45. Government of India, Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. VII, No. 9, September 1961, p. 255.

46. Belgrade Conference, n.3, p. 134.

47. Belgrade Conference, n.3, pp. 25-26.

country in discovering that a policy of non-alignment is the best guarantee for safeguarding our national and international position have undoubtedly helped others to come to a similar conclusion.<sup>48</sup>

While referring to the Belgrade Conference, Seokarno said:

And now we have this present conference ... to draw the non-aligned countries into a coordinated and accumulated moral force in order to help preserve world peace and bring about a new stable equilibrium based on a world order and social justice and prosperity.<sup>49</sup>

There seemed a degree of cohesion among the participating countries. All agreed that the underlying emphasis of non-alignment was on "depolarization" and the NAM was not designated to form a "third bloc" or a "third force". The speeches delivered by the participants commonly laid stress on the pursuit of the policy of non-alignment through peaceful co-existence. The final declaration noted that the urge of the non-aligned countries was to 'draw the attention of the world community to the existing situation and to the necessity that all people should exert efforts to find a sure road towards the stabilization of peace'.<sup>50</sup>

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48. Government of India, Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. VII, No. 9, September 1961, pp. 256-57.

49. Ibid., p. 38.

50. NAM Documents, n.1, p. 6.

The peaceful co-existence entailed cooperation between powers irrespective of difference, ideological or otherwise, between their socio-political and economic systems. The remarkable feature discernible in the Conference was the general awareness among the non-aligned countries that they had to work for world peace jointly. It was also pleaded that the non-aligned countries should work together in the United Nations in a concerted way. At the same time, the leading participating countries like India, cautioned that such a move should in no way be interpreted as an attempt at forging a third bloc. The urgency for peace as a pre-requisite of any progress was discernible in the thinking of all members. The Burmese Prime Minister U Nu said:

The first pre-requisite of a sane and sober conduct of negotiations is the restoration of a calm atmosphere, free from frenzy or hysteria. Here the non-aligned countries can play a significant role ... part of our deliberations be directed towards ways and means of bringing about this cooling off process.<sup>51</sup>

Establishment and strengthening of international peace and security was given priority at the Conference and its resultant impact was the issuance of the 'Statement on the Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace' by the Conference. The Berlin question received urgent attention.

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51. Belgrade Conference, n.3, p. 69.

Indonesia and Yugoslavia pleaded for the sovereignty of the two German states, free access to West Berlin and neutralization of Germany. Ghana and others supported this move. India pleaded for the recognition of the realities as they existed.<sup>52</sup>

The question of disarmament was also deliberated by the Conference. The need for urgent negotiations between the two super powers was stressed. Nehru while addressing the Conference observed:

... I consider disarmament an absolute necessity for the peace of the world in future - I think that without disarmament these difficulties, fears and conflicts will continue - nevertheless, one cannot expect suddenly because this conference wants it, disarmament to appear on the scene in full panoply. We should lay stress on disarmament of course, but for the present moment the only thing that we can do is to lay stress on the fact of negotiations with a view to getting over these present fears and dangers.<sup>53</sup>

India's viewpoint was strongly reflected in the final communique of the Conference which inter-alia mentioned:

... Disarmament is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical solution of this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the present state of armament, can be achieved only by means of a general complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament.<sup>54</sup>

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52. Foreign Affairs Record, n. , p. 258.

53. Ibid., pp. 257-58.

54. NAM Document, n. 1, p. 7.

The problem of imperialism and colonialism was also discussed in details at the Conference. The view that "neo-colonialism" was a new manifestation of imperialism got a wide support. Majority of the participating countries were not willing to concede the view that colonialism was dead. The Conference while welcoming the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" passed by the UN General Assembly in 1960 as a legal and political basis for the elimination of colonialism, demanded its sincere implementation. It also called for ending all practices of racial discrimination.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made touching reference to the Continent of Africa with specific emphasis on Congo, Angola, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, which were struggling for shaking off the colonial yoke, while expressing concern over the events in Angola, Nehru said:

That though Angola had been a closed book but something is happening in Angola - not only in Angola, but round about which really was a kind of horror, massacres, genocide and so on. Of course, our minds go out and we would not only sympathise, we want to do what we can to put an end to this.<sup>55</sup>

While expressing concern over the apartheid policy of the white racist regime of South Africa, Nehru said:

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55. Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), Vol. VII, No.9, September 1961, p. 250.

And further, in South Africa, you have the supreme - symbol of racial arrogance, racial discrimination apartheid, and all that which is an intolerable position to be accepted by any of us.<sup>56</sup>

The import of India's emphasis was envisaged in the final declaration adopted by the NAM Summit at Belgrade. India made brief reference to these issues whereas the Belgrade NAM Declaration gave a comprehensive coverage to focus the attention of the non-aligned countries and the global community towards the problem of apartheid in South Africa. The Belgrade Declaration inter-alia noted:

The participants in the conference resolutely condemn the policy of apartheid practised by the Union of South Africa and demanded the immediate abandonment of this policy, they further state that the policy of racial discrimination anywhere in the world constitutes a grave violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>57</sup>

The Conference reiterated the faith of non-aligned countries in the United Nations. It showed the optimum universal concern for the strengthening and extension of the UN's influence in the world.<sup>58</sup> Expressing India's position vis-a-vis UN, Pt. Nehru told the Conference:

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56. Ibid.

57. Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries 1961-1978 (Belgrade, 1978), p. 7.

58. Foreign Affairs Record, n.55, p. 258.

The whole frame work of the United Nations ever since it was formed fifteen years ago was the recognition of the balance of power in the world. That is why they have permanent had certain members in the Security Council vetoing etc ... Now, of course, the world has changed since then, considerably... and this requires a change in the structure, etc., of the United Nations.<sup>59</sup>

The final communique of the Conference urged for the appropriate changes in the structure of the UN Secretariat. It inter-alia envisaged: The unity of the World Organization and the assuring of the efficiency of its work makes it absolutely necessary to evolve a more appropriate structure for the Secretariat of the United Nations bearing in mind equitable regional distribution.<sup>60</sup>

The participating countries laid special emphasis on according recognition to the People's Republic of China and demanded the revision of the structure of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in favour of greater representation of African and Asian countries.

The Conference ended with the adoption of two documents: (i) 'Statement on Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace' and (ii) 'Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries'. The 'Statement on the

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59. NAM Documents, n.1, p. 8.

60. Belgrade Conference, n.3, p. 117.



Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace' was adopted mainly due to India's endeavours. Nehru had underlined the emphasis on this aspect when he told the Conference:

When this matter comes up and some kind of resolution or declaration or statement is being issued attention will be paid to this question of world peace being put not only foremost but so that it catches every person's attention and so that it does not get lost in a morass of detail and thus lose all significance and importance.<sup>61</sup>

Krishna Menon said on 3 September 1961, that there was a sharp difference of opinion in the Committee entrusted with drafting the communique over the question of separating the war threat from colonialism, and in giving primacy to the former.<sup>62</sup> Eventually the Indian view-point prevailed.

The 'Statement on the Danger of War and Appeal for Peace' expressed the deep concern of one-third of humanity represented at the Conference about 'the imminent and ominous prospect of conflict ... would inevitably lead to devastation on a scale hitherto unknown, if not to world annihilation'.<sup>63</sup> The conference demanded as urgent and imperative that the parties concerned, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, should immediately sus-

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61. The Hindustan Times, 5 September 1961.

62. Belgrade Conference, n.3, p. 69.

63. Ibid.

pend their war preparations and take no steps which would further aggravate the situation and should resume negotiations.<sup>64</sup> The similar emphasis was incorporated in the opening statement of the final 'Declaration' of the Conference which envisaged its purpose as 'contributing more effectively to world peace and security and peaceful co-operation among peoples'.<sup>65</sup>

The general mood of the Conference manifested a spirit of accommodation and cooperation. Though differences were discernible among the participating countries but they in no way hindered the smooth functioning of the Conference. Such differences were natural in the wake of the varying emotional complexes of the various non-aligned countries, represented at the Conference, which belonged to different regions of the world and conditions by varying stages of development. The King of Morocco in his concluding speech observed: 'The Conference may be proud of the fact that it has not fulfilled the expectation of the bad prophets'.<sup>66</sup>

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64. Ibid., p. 253.

65. Ibid., p. 263.

66. Ibid.

While referring to socio-economic problems faced by the newly independent countries, Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, said:

many of the countries represented here have only recently become free as independent. They have the tremendous problems and above all the problems of making good and to advance their own people economically, socially etc., we must recognise that most of these countries are socially and economically backward and it is not an easy matter to get rid of this inheritance of backwardness and under-development.<sup>67</sup>

He further added that:

it enjoined to help the economically backward countries, while conceding that the rich countries had rendered economic assistance to the economically backward countries to some extent,

He further emphasised:

I think they should do more of it but whatever they may do, the ultimate burden will lie on the people of our own countries.<sup>68</sup>

Thus Nehru was certain that though foreign economic assistance was necessary but in his view, it was essential for the developing countries to mobilize their own resources. Because if by some miracle or somebody's else's help, we stood up, well, we should fall down again. Ulti-

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67. Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), Vol. VII, No.9, September 1961, p. 259.

68. Ibid.

mately the burden is on us. So it is no good expecting others to do all of our work.<sup>69</sup>

The similar emphasis was discernible from the final declaration adopted by the NAM Summit held at Belgrade. It urged the need for making efforts to remove economic imbalance inherited from colonialism and imperialism.<sup>70</sup>

The participating non-aligned countries regarded it necessary to narrow down, through accelerated economic, industrial and agricultural development, the ever-widening gap in the standard of living between the rich countries and economically less-developed countries. The Belgrade NAM Conference mooted the idea of the immediate establishment and operation of a United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF).<sup>71</sup> The Conference also urged for just terms of trade for the economically less-developed countries and in particular, to launch constructive efforts to eliminate the excessive fluctuations in primary commodities trade and the restrictive measures and practices "which adversely affect the trade and revenues of the newly developing countries."<sup>72</sup>

The Conference also called upon "all countries concerned to consider to convene, as soon as possible, an in-

69. Ibid.

70. Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries 1961-1978 (Belgrade, 1978), p. 8.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

ternational conference to discuss their common problems and to reach an agreement on the ways and means of repelling all damage which may hinder their development and to discuss and to agree upon most effective measures to ensure the realization of their economic and social development.<sup>73</sup>

Thus it is evident from the above analysis that the suggestions mooted and decisions adopted by the Belgrade NAM Conference with regard to measures designed to envisage economic development of the developing countries, were more comprehensive than suggested by India.

The NAM presented 'a spark of fresh hope which may restore confidence ... in this trouble-some period'.<sup>74</sup> The Times published from London in its editorial opined that the countries represented at Belgrade had remained largely unaligned, even among themselves, and that they were unable to form a bloc.<sup>75</sup> This was the main objective of the Belgrade Conference. The non-alignment was envisaged as a movement and not as a new power bloc. To this extent, the Belgrade Conference was a big success and a great landmark. NAM had become more self-confidence and more confident.<sup>76</sup>

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73. Ibid.

74. Times (London), 7 September 1961.

75. Ibid.

76. Malik, n. 6 , p. 193.

### India's Role in the First Non-Aligned Summit

India's role in the Belgrade Conference and the views expressed by India at this Conference have already been analysed in the preceding pages.

India being one of the leading non-aligned countries played a pivotal role at the Belgrade Conference. In the beginning, as discussed in the preceding pages, India was not very enthusiastic about the idea of the Conference. Such an Indian attitude was perhaps governed by the fact that, apart from the general outlook as non-alignment, common to the non-aligned countries, their motives, perceptions and policies were heterogeneous to a great extent.

The prospective participating countries at the Belgrade Conference seemed to be pre-occupied with their local problems and had militant anti-colonial stance. In the wake of these circumstances, India wanted to be sure whether the proposed Conference would result in attaching the same significance to world peace which it demanded at that time.

As Tito, Nasser and Soekarno went ahead with the idea of convening the Conference, India also endorsed it and actively cooperated with these countries. India's stand on major global issues like maintaining world peace

and averting the war, dis-armament, Berlin crisis etc. received wider support. The incorporation of these issues in the final declaration vindicated India's stand.

India played a pivotal role in stressing the need for maintaining cohesion and unity among the non-aligned countries. India's stand that the NAM was not a "third force" or "third power bloc" but an on-going movement gained full support of the participating countries.

At the Conference itself India acted as a great check on the tendencies to condemn others and to become polemical, to have partisan approach in favour of one Cold War antagonist against the other and to indulge in pressure politics.<sup>77</sup>

India's Premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, who represented India at the Conference, urged the participating non-aligned countries to accord top priority to world peace and a special urgency to it. India's suggestion, though opposed by some countries which wanted to accord priority to anti-colonial stance, was finally taken up by the Conference. This resulted in issuing a special statement on 'Danger of War and Appeal for Peace' to Super Powers. It was a vindication of India's stand. There is no exaggeration in saying that India gave a lead to the NAM at Belgrade Conference without trying to dominate it.

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77. Ibid., p. 194.

## Chapter IV

INDIA'S ROLE AT THE SECOND SUMMIT OF THE  
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES (CAIRO, OCTOBER 1964)

The second Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries was held at Cairo, the Egyptian capital, from 5 to 10 October 1964. It was attended by 47 countries of Asia, 17 countries from Africa attended and 4 Arab countries also participated. Among the observers, 9 were from Latin America and the tenth was Finland. The following countries participated as fullfledged members:<sup>1</sup> Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia. The following countries were represented by observers:<sup>2</sup> Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Finland,

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1. Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries 1961-1978 (hereafter NAM Documents) (Belgrade, 1978), p. 19.

2. Ibid.



Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States were also present as observers.

(a) Background to the Second Summit:

The success of the first NAM Summit Conference held in Belgrade in September 1961 had proved that the newly independent states of Asia and Africa were determined to pursue the policy of non-alignment. In July 1962, a Conference on the Problems of Economic Development was held in Cairo from 9-18 July 1962 as a follow-up of the Belgrade Conference. This meeting was attended by 31 countries and 5 countries were represented as observers.

Agenda of this meeting included - internal problems of economic development including the mobilization of resources and elimination of obstacles and social growth, promotion of economic, technical and trade co-operation and development of transportation among developing countries, prospects of economic development and trade between the developed and developing countries, and economic and technical assistance to the developing countries.<sup>3</sup>

The final declaration of the conference on the problems of Economic Development viewed with concern the

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3. Ibid., p. 12.

growing disparities in the standards of living prevailing in different parts of the world. It further noted that apart from the universal acknowledgement of the urgency to accelerate the pace of development in less developed countries, 'adequate means of concrete and positive nature have not been adopted to enable the developing countries to attain a reasonable rate of growth'.<sup>4</sup> It also focussed attention on the internal problems of economic development faced by the developing countries especially in the field of mobilization of human, material and financial resources.

While regarding the expansion of trade between developing countries, particularly on regional basis, as a contributory factor for economic development, the conference recommended appropriate measures to be taken to promote such an objective.<sup>5</sup> It also called upon the developing countries to undertake initiative for the promotion of mutual, bilateral and broader relations in the fields of trade, payments, financing, technical and scientific co-operation, industrial cooperation, transport and communications.

Export earnings of the developing countries being vital to the economic development of the latter, the con-

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4. Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries 1961-1979), Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries.

5. Ibid., p. 14.

ference suggested the developing countries to continue consultations in order to:

- Exchange information and views between them on question regarding economic relations with industrialized countries.
- Concert mutually the attitudes to be adopted by them with regard to economic question examined by international organizations;
- exchange views and prepare the ground for concerted action in connection with any negative effects of integration policies of industrial countries.<sup>6</sup>

The conference finally called upon the participating countries to cooperate closely in the United Nations and the other international bodies with a view to ensuring economic progress and strengthening peace among all nations.

This conference was convened mainly at the initiative of Yugoslav President, Marshal Tito to 'discuss issues of economic development and thereby to mobilize political support behind the development organization proposal'.<sup>7</sup> The Cairo meeting was attended by almost the same countries which participated at the Belgrade Summit. A notable feature of the conference was the participation

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6. Ibid.

7. Robert A. Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics (New York, 1980), p. 16.

of Raul Prebisch as head of the Argentinian delegation as observer. He was then the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and was later to become the first Secretary-General of the UNCTAD. Raul Prebisch's participation proved instrumental in strengthening the interest of Latin America.

The intervening period between the Belgrade Summit and the holding of the second NAM Summit at Cairo in October 1964 was marked by major developments which wielded considerable influence on the succeeding events. Primary among these was the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 at Addis Ababa.<sup>8</sup> The formation of the OAU had for the time being avoided the split among the African countries into different blocs. By the early 1960s, there had developed among the newly independent African states some serious divisions over questions regarding the nature and extent of Pan-African Cooperation and the character of their foreign and domestic policies.

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8. For details on OAU see, Mark W. Zacher, International Conflicts and Collective Security : The UN, OAS, OAU and The Arab League, 1946-1977 (New York, 1979), pp. 121-55.

The formation of the OAU as a single continental organization improved Africa's capacity to present a common front on broad issues like economic development. 32 independent African countries were represented in this organization.<sup>9</sup> The member countries of the OAU, ECLA and the Asian countries were able to issue a Joint Declaration on their conception of the purposes of the forthcoming Geneva Conference on Trade and Development.<sup>10</sup>

By the beginning of 1960s, when the first NAM Summit was held in Belgrade, but for few colonial vestiges, the wave of independence had swept across the continents of Asia and Africa. The emphasis at the Belgrade Summit was on political emancipation which hitherto acquired added emphasis on economic development. The Geneva Conference on Trade and Development held from March to June 1964 resulted in the establishment of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It came to be known as UNCTAD-I. It discussed the question like tariff reduction, expansion of their market opportunities, stabilization of raw materials prices, provisions of greater financial resources for development, and improvement of their share in the "invisibles" of trade

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9. Robert A. Mortimer, n.7, p. 16.

10. For full text of the Joint Declaration see, Alfred George Moss and Harry N.M. Winton, (eds.), A New International Economic Order: Selected Documents 1945-75 (New York, UNITAR, 1978), pp. 18-19.

such as shipping and insurance. There arose a sort of "confrontation" between the industrialized and the developing countries on the question of future set up of the UNCTAD. The industrialized countries of the West had agreed to the UNCTAD Conference with great reluctance and were rather opposed to the establishment of a new distinct organization of trade and development. The developed countries were of the view that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) could be relied upon for harmonising trade relations. However, the developing countries wanted a new agency despite the fact that there prevailed difference of opinions among them about the precise form of such an institution. The 75 developing countries at the Geneva Conference insisted on envisaging a new agency. These countries came to be known as the Group of 77.<sup>11</sup>

The developed countries of the West demanded that the new international machinery should be subordinate to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). These countries further proposed equal representation to developed and developing countries on the Standing Committee, or, as later amended, a vote procedure by which a

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11. The initial strength of developing countries demanding the establishment of the UNCTAD was 75. Following the withdrawal of New Zealand, but addition of Kenya, South Korea and South Vietnam raised their numerical strength to 77 and it came to be called as the Group of 77.

majority vote of the 12 major trading countries would be required on substantive decisions.<sup>12</sup> In other words, the developed countries endeavoured to limit the autonomy of the UNCTAD and to retain a veto by any combination of size of the industrial power. On the other hand, the developing countries pioneered the cause of an independent agency on which their numerical majority could be exercised. There were heated debates giving rise to the speculation that the nascent Group of 77 might split up under strain in their quest for achieving a common bargain position, but the process finally strengthened the merging developmental coalition.<sup>13</sup> It proved the bargaining and numerical strength of the developing countries.

Along with this intense desire of gaining economic leverage, the non-aligned countries were also viewing for leadership of the NAM. Such a trend was pre-eminently discernible in Asian countries.

President Soekarno of Indonesia was trying to convene a second Bandung type conference of exclusively Asian-African meeting with China, Pakistan, Turkey and

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12. Robert A. Mortimore, n.7, p. 17.

13. Branislav Gasovic, UNCTAD: Conflict and Compromise (Leiden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1972), p. 51.

some other non-aligned countries being included, but excluding Yugoslavia, the European neutrals and the non-aligned countries of Latin America.<sup>14</sup> The Indonesian move could not go through, 'had it taken place, it might have been the end of non-alignment'.<sup>15</sup>

Yugoslavia suggested in 1963 to convene a second conference of the non-aligned countries. In October 1963, Egypt and Sri Lanka agreeing to Yugoslavia suggestion also called for convening a second non-aligned conference. Such a move upset the Indonesian plan for a second Bandung. Soekarno's plan suited China. Evidently, an Asian-African platform comprising aligned and non-aligned countries was conducive for China's entry into world politics.

This idea could not find favour with India, Egypt and Yugoslavia, the pioneer founders of the NAM. The exchange of Sino-Indian hostilities in October 1962 had undermined India's prestige as the leader of Asia and the situation helped in boosting China's image. Besides, in the wake of growing Sino-Soviet schism during this period,

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14. Rikhi Jaipal, Non-Alignment, Origins, Growth and Potential for World Peace (New Delhi, 1983), p. 80.

15. Ibid.



most of the non-aligned countries disliked the emergence of China as the leader of the NAM at the displeasure of Soviet Union. 'The non-aligned countries particularly Egypt, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, would not, however, permit a regional diversion like Bandung to jeopardise the success of the second non-aligned summit'.<sup>16</sup> India too supported Yugoslav-Egyptian move.

(b) Foreign Ministers' Meeting and Decisions  
(COLOMBO Preparatory Meeting):

The first NAM Summit held at Belgrade in 1961 had not laid down any hard and fast rules with regard to holding of the subsequent summit conferences. It was left to the non-aligned countries to decide themselves as when and where to hold the forthcoming summit conference. At the initiative of Yugoslavia, Egypt and other non-aligned countries a Preparatory Meeting was convened at Colombo in March 1964. Yugoslavia, Egypt and Sri Lanka had on 18 February 1964 issued an appeal-cum-invitation to the Heads of State or Government of the 25 non-aligned countries which had attended the Belgrade summit conference, to participate in the Preparatory Meeting at Colombo to be held in March 1964. It was to discuss two major issues - ex-

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16. Ibid., p. 81.

pansion of membership of the non-aligned countries and the organizational preparation for the forthcoming summit conference. Decisions at the NAM conference are generally arrived at on the basis of consensus. If any occasion arises when the majority of non-aligned members attending a conference have favoured the issue which is being opposed ~~to~~ by a few participating countries, efforts are usually made to have a unanimous support.<sup>17</sup> At the Colombo Preparatory Meeting, when majority of the participating countries agreed to invite Venezuela, the Cuban delegate, who had in the beginning opposed the move, decided to withdraw its discussion and followed the majority in favour of inviting Venezuela to the non-aligned conference.<sup>18</sup>

There was a general desire among the participating countries to interpret liberally the established criteria of membership as envisaged at the Belgrade Summit Conference without prejudice to its essence. The consensus also merged to extend invitation to as many "observers" as were willing to attend from Latin America and Europe. National Liberation Movements were free of course to participate and express their views in accordance to the practice established in 1961.

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17. Malabika Banerjee, The Non-Aligned Movement (Calcutta, 1982), p. 56.

18. "Report of the Colombo Preparatory Conference", Documents of the Conferences of Non-Aligned States (New Delhi, MEA, 1973) (Ministry of External Affairs).

Besides discussing the criterion for membership, the Preparatory Meeting also discussed the draft agenda submitted by various participating countries. The Somali delegate introduced an item to the effect that member states should find out means to settle differences peacefully through the good offices of other non-aligned countries. The final word covering this item read as follows: "Settlement of disputes without the threat or use of force in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and particularly the right to self-determination".<sup>19</sup>

A meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Non-aligned countries was held on 2 October 1964 on the eve of the Cairo Summit Conference where a revised agenda for the summit was approved. Great importance was attached to the liquidation of colonialism by adding a sub-item: "concerted action for national liberation of dependent countries". The "self-determination" was incorporated as a separate item.

(c) Organizational Issues and Their Solution:

As mentioned supra, the second NAM Summit Conference was held at Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964. The

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19. Ibid.

final declaration of the conference was called "The Programme for Peace and International Cooperation". There were no major organizational issues involved at the Cairo Summit Conference. The Preparatory Meeting held at Colombo had already sorted out the issues like criterion for selection of new members and the finalization of the agenda. This was done in order to facilitate the smooth and successful functioning of the conference. The final Declaration noted with satisfaction the great enthusiasm evoked by the Cairo Summit Conference. 'This emphasizes the rightness, efficacy, and vigour of the policy of non-alignment and its constructive role in the maintenance and consolidation of international peace and security'.<sup>20</sup> It further acknowledged that 'the principles of non-alignment, thanks to the confidence they inspire in the world, are becoming an increasingly dynamic and powerful force for promotion of peace and the welfare of mankind'.<sup>21</sup>

(d) International Problems, Summit's Decisions and India's Role in the Second Non-Aligned Summit:

Before we analyse the decisions or recommendations of the Second Cairo Summit on contemporary international

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20. "The Programme for Peace and International Cooperation", NAM Documents, n.1, p. 19.

21. Ibid.

problems and India's role in this summit, it deems appropriate to briefly survey the domestic and external developments since the conclusion of the Belgrade Summit till the convening of the second summit at Cairo.

Exactly, a year after the Belgrade summit conference, the relations between India and China had deteriorated considerably leading to the hot exchange of hostilities between the two countries in October 1962. The Chinese aggression on India proved to be the greatest test of latter's non-aligned policy. China launched a massive attack on Indian territory and occupied a substantial portion of Indian territory in Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam.

India faced the Chinese attack with all might. Prime Minister Nehru believed that Beijing might desist from launching a major attack in anticipation of its repercussions on world opinion.<sup>22</sup> Nursing this notion, Nehru wished to avoid any "adventurist action".<sup>23</sup> He regarded it unwise to undertake extra-ordinary measures which might discard the character of non-aligned diplomacy.<sup>24</sup>

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22. Government of India, Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, Vol. I (New Delhi, 1962), p. 124.

23. Ibid., pp. 46-57.

24. Ibid., p. 119.

But when China launched fulfledged attack, Nehru told the Lok Sabha: 'For five years, we have been victims of Chinese aggression ..... occasionally, there were some incidents and conflicts. These conflicts might well be termed frontier incidents. Today we have seen a regular and massive invasion of our territory by very large forces'.<sup>25</sup> Under these circumstances India solicited help from the Western countries and the Soviet Union, U.K., the United States and Canada provided arms and economic assistance. This necessitated India's increased collaboration with the Western countries which was characterized as a pro-Western attitude in India's foreign policy. On 5 November 1962, the then U.S. Ambassador to India, J.K. Galbraith, clarifying the position of India said that U.S. military aid to India was simply an assistance. While endorsing India's policy of non-alignment, he said that American Government did not want to envisage any change in India's foreign policy.<sup>26</sup>

In view of the Western arms and other kinds of military help to India, it was speculated by some countries that India's non-alignment might get diluted. 'In

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25. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, September 1961 - May 1964, Vol. IV (New Delhi, 1964), p. 230.

26. The Statesman (New Delhi), 7 November, 1962.

course of time it became clear that only some pro-Chinese non-aligned powers like Indonesia, Guinea, Mali, Ghana etc were being prejudiced against India',<sup>27</sup> and had given rise to such speculations.

It is to be observed here, that India in the event of Chinese aggression was able to procure, requisite arms and economic aid both from the East and West because of its policy of non-alignment. The military aid acquired by India from outside was designed to make itself capable of safeguarding country's territorial integrity. It devised long term planning for attaining self sufficiency in defence production. This was keeping in tune with India's policy of non-alignment.

After Nehru's death in May 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri became the Prime Minister of India. 'But he could not take any initiative to bring a change in India's non-aligned policy, and followed Nehru's policy.'<sup>28</sup> While addressing the second NAM Summit at Cairo, Lal Bahadur Shastri said: "Though Jawaharlalji is no longer with us, the government and people of India stand dedicated to freedom

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27. D.N. Malik, Development of Non-Alignment in India's Foreign Policy, (Allahabad, 1967), p. 267.

28. Gandhijee Roy, The Non-Aligned Diplomacy of Mrs Indira Gandhi (Patna, 1983), p. 96.

and peace, to the principle of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence and to the eradication of racialism and colonialism'.<sup>29</sup> Lal Bahadur Shastri represented India at the Cairo NAM Summit. Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the founders of the NAM could not live long to see the movement ripening into fruition. India was represented by its new Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri.

The second NAM Summit Conference at Cairo addressed itself to the urgent task of maintaining peace throughout the world and envisage international cooperation instead of confrontation. The participating countries 'while declaring their contribution towards the establishment of just and lasting peace in the world, affirm that the preservation of peace and the promotion of the well-being of peoples are a collective responsibility deriving from the natural aspirations of mankind to live in a better world'.<sup>30</sup>

The Prime Minister of India, Lal Bahadur Shastri, in his address at the second NAM Summit held at Cairo emphasising the importance of peace made no direct reference

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29. Lal Bahadur Shastri's speech at the Second NAM Summit at Cairo, Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (Cairo, 1964), p. 103.

30. NAM Documents, n.4, p. 19.



to the establishment of foreign military bases, especially by the United States and the need for dismantling them. It can be surmised that his assertion was based on the fact that India supported fully the United States programmes for peace and development,<sup>31</sup> could imply this aspect as well, but this was not so because the final declaration adopted by the second NAM Summit held at Cairo made an elaborated reference to the issue. The final declaration noted with concern the fact that "foreign military bases are in practice a means of bringing pressure on nations and retarding their emancipation and development, based on their own ideological political, economic and cultural ideas."<sup>32</sup>

Thus the Conference declared its full support to the evacuation of foreign bases and called upon all countries maintaining troops and bases in other countries to remove them. It also accused the United States for maintaining its military base at Guantanamo in Cuba in defiance of the will of the Cuban people. Noting that the Cuban Government had expressed its readiness to settle its dispute over the Guantanamo (Cuba) base with the US

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31. Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), Vol. X, No.10, October 1964, p. 247.

32. Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961-78, Belgrade 1978, p. 25.

on an equal footing, the Conference called upon the US Government to "negotiate the evacuation of this base with the Cuban Government."<sup>33</sup>

#### Nuclear Disarmament:

India attached top priority to the question of nuclear disarmament at the Cairo Summit. The negotiations between the US and Soviet Union were in progress with regard to resume negotiations on nuclear disarmament. India noted with satisfaction that there had been a measure of agreement, however, limited, at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.<sup>34</sup> India further expressed the view that the non-aligned countries should continue to play a helpful role in promoting an agreement towards total disarmament. The final Declaration of the Cairo Summit Conference also attached the paramount importance to disarmament 'as one of the basic problems of the contemporary world and stressed the necessity of reaching immediate and practical solution which would free mankind from the danger of war and sense of insecurity'.<sup>35</sup> It further urged the super

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33. Ibid., p. 26.

34. Cairo Documents, n. 29, p. 104.

35. NAM Documents, n. 1, p. 29.

powers and other countries to render full cooperation to the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) with a view to the rapid conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

India also expressed serious concern at the fact that all countries had not subscribed to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)<sup>36</sup> signed at Moscow in 1963. It called upon all the non-aligned nations to take a clear and forthright attitude in persuading all the countries to accept the ban on nuclear tests and 'our moral support must be brought to bear on those countries which still refuse to subscribe to the partial nuclear test ban treaty'.<sup>37</sup> The Cairo Conference also called upon 'all states to accede to the Moscow treaty partially banning the testing of nuclear weapons and to abide its provisions in the interests of peace and the welfare of humanity'.<sup>38</sup>

The Indian delegate expressed specific concern about the newly emerging nuclear powers. It is worth mentioning here that at the time of convening of the Cairo Summit, mainland China was about to detonate the nuclear explosion. He urged the conference to 'consider the re-

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36. Cairo Documents, n. 29, p. 105.

37. Ibid.

38. NAM Documents, n. 1, p. 25.

cent disturbing indication which suggest that China is about to explode a nuclear device. I would propose that we might consider sending a special mission to persuade China to desist from developing nuclear weapons'.<sup>39</sup>

India's concern about China's going nuclear was not governed by the fact that it had differences with the latter, 'but the threat to humanity from one more country having nuclear weapons at its disposal is a far more serious matter'.<sup>40</sup> Affirming its commitment to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, Prime Minister Shastri told the Cairo Summit that even though technically India had the capacity of developing nuclear weapons but 'our scientists and technicians are under firm orders not to make a single experiment, not to perfect a single device which is not needed for the peaceful uses of atomic energy'.<sup>41</sup> Though the Cairo Declaration made no specific reference to China but requested 'the Great Powers to abstain from all policies conducive to the discrimination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those states which do not at present possess them'.<sup>42</sup>

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39. Cairo Documents, n.29, p. 105.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. NAM Documents, n. 1, p. 25.

Another notable feature of the Cairo Declaration was the emphasis on the cooperative development of the peaceful use of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind. Thus it is evident from the above that most of the salient points mooted by India on the question of nuclear disarmament were incorporated in the final declaration of the second NAM Summit Conference.

#### Peaceful Settlement of Border Disputes:

India emphasised on the need for settlement of border disputes through peaceful means. It noted that frequent fightings broke out in different parts of the world because neighbours had boundary disputes. Indian delegate in his address to the Cairo Conference welcomed the announcement of Soviet Union and other countries not to use force for solving territorial disputes or question of frontiers and hailed it 'as a positive lead which must be followed and the principle should be made universal'.<sup>43</sup>

The final Cairo Declaration while observing that the use of force might take a number of forms, military and economic, urged that the 'participating countries deem it essential to affirm the principles that all the states shall refrain in their international relations from the

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43. Cairo Documents, n. 29, p. 106.

threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state ...<sup>44</sup> In order to make this principle successful, India mooted the suggestion of evolving other methods of settling such disputes. While suggesting the direct negotiations between the parties concerned as an ideal solution, India opined that the basis of negotiations should be the customary or traditional boundaries which might be in existence and not any new boundaries created by force of any kind.<sup>45</sup>

The final Cairo document expressed the conviction of the participating countries of 'the necessity of exerting all international efforts to find solutions to all situations which threaten international peace or impair friendly relations among nations'.<sup>46</sup> Thus on this score also the Indian viewpoint got full endorsement from the other participating countries.

Elimination of Colonialism, Imperialism and Racial Discrimination:

India also voiced its concern for the elimination of colonialism, aggression, subversion and racial dis-

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44. NAM Documents, n. 1, p. 24.

45. Cairo Documents, n. 29, p. 106.

46. NAM Documents, n. 1, p. 24.

crimination. The final document of the Cairo Summit adopted this declaration in two parts. The first part dealt with 'concerted Action for the Liberation of the countries still Dependent; Elimination of Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism and Imperialism'; and the second part dealt with 'Racial Discrimination and the Policy of Apartheid'.

India's support for the liberation of the countries still dependent was inspired by its own experience of freedom struggle. The Indian delegate told the conference that 'both because of our past history and our own freedom struggle, we stand unequivocally for the emancipation of colonies and dependent countries.'<sup>47</sup>

The Cairo Declaration observed that imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism constituted a basic source of international tension and conflict because they endangered world peace and security. India expressed concern over some of the African states like Angola, Mozambique, Guinea and South Rhodesia (it adopted the name Zimbabwe after attaining independence) which were still reeling under colonial yoke. It also decried the continued rule of South Africa over Namibia as illegal. While greeting the Angolan freedom-fighters India offered them 'full support for the success of their heroic struggle for independence'.<sup>48</sup>

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47. Cairo Documents, n.29, p. 106.

48. Ibid.

The Cairo Declaration adopted a detailed resolution in this regard making a specific reference to each dependent colony of Africa. The Conference while noting that the process of liberation was irresistible and irreversible, further warned that the 'colonized people may legitimately resort to arms to secure the full exercise of their right to self-determination and independence if the colonial powers persist in opposing their natural aspirations.<sup>49</sup> The Cairo Summit made a specific reference to the restoration of all rights of the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle for liberation.<sup>50</sup>

The conference also reaffirmed the right of peoples to self-determination and make their own destiny.<sup>51</sup> India while pledging its support to the right of self-determination for dependent territories under colonial rule, told the participating countries; that self-determination is the right of any country that is dominated by another. But there can be no self-determination for different areas and regions within a sovereign and independent country, for this would lead to fragmentation and disruption and no country's integrity would be safe.<sup>52</sup>

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49. NAM Documents, n. 1, p. 20.

50. Ibid., p. 47.

51. Ibid., p. 22.

52. Cairo Documents, n. 29, p. 107.



However, the final Cairo Declaration did not contain this reference.

India denounced the hateful policies of apartheid and racial discrimination of the racist regime of South Africa as an affront to mankind. The Prime Minister further told that India had severed trade relations with South Africa as early as in 1946, and she has adhered to firmly to this policy through all these years.<sup>53</sup> It called for strict economic sanctions against South Africa by the world community. The Cairo Declaration also unequivocally voiced its concern over the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination of South African government which in its opinion constituted a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>54</sup> It called upon all the participating countries and big powers to implement United Nations resolution concerning sanctions against South Africa. It made special appeal to all countries to render 'their support to the special bureau set up by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the application of sanctions against South Africa'.<sup>55</sup>

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53. Ibid.

54. NAM Documents, n.1, p. 22.

55. Ibid.

**Programme for Economic Development:**

The Cairo Summit was held just after the UNCTAD-I in which the non-aligned developing countries, also known as "Group of 77" had played a pivotal role. The participating countries pledged their support to the Joint Declaration of the "Group of 77".<sup>56</sup> The Cairo resolution on Economic Development and Cooperation in a bid to tackle the problems of trade and economic development, urged all states to implement on an urgent basis the recommendation contained in the final act of the UNCTAD relating to the establishment of new international institutions.

India emphasised that its concept of programme for economic development through international cooperation did not mean seeking mere economic assistance from the developed world but 'it is basically a programme of greater effort on the part of each on our own feet'.<sup>57</sup> India did not deny the necessity of outside economic assistance for economic development of the developing countries, but such aid, in its view should come without any strings. India emphasised on the fact that the developing countries should help themselves. Citing India's own example, Prime

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56. Ibid., p. 27.

57. Cairo Documents, n. 29, p. 107.

Minister Shastri told the Cairo Summit: 'we in India are trying our best to muster technical and material resources to participate in a programme of economic cooperation with other developing countries to whom we can offer assistance'.<sup>58</sup>

India while welcoming the UNCTAD-I's recommendations as important steps in the right direction, further observed that it was not satisfied with what had been done or promised so far. Indian delegate told the Conference: 'Unless the developing countries can expand and diversify their export trade, unless the transfer of capital from the developed to the developing countries on satisfactory terms can be accelerated, economic progress will not attain a pace compatible with peace and freedom'.<sup>59</sup>

It appears from the above analysis that there was almost a convergence of opinion between India and that of the final Cairo Declaration of the second NAM Summit on the question of economic development and cooperation between the non-aligned countries.

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58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

Strengthening the United Nations:

India appreciated the role of the United Nations (UN) which 'as a whole has given support to the policies and programmes of the peace, freedom and progress'.<sup>60</sup> India urged the non-aligned nations to support the UN not in words but in action. It envisaged a greater responsibility on the non-aligned countries in strengthening the peace keeping operations of the UN. Citing India's case of placing its armed forces at the disposal of the UN, Prime Minister Shastri told the participating countries: 'It is on the non-aligned nations that the brunt of supplying forces for the peace-keeping operations falls'.<sup>61</sup>

The Cairo Declaration also laid stress on strengthening the world organization. While recognising the paramount importance of the UN and the necessity of enabling it to discharge the functions entrusted to it, the Conference felt that the 'Non-Aligned countries should consult one another at the Foreign Ministers or Head of the Delegation level at each session of the United Nations'.<sup>62</sup>

India felt that everything was not right with the UN because so many conflicts and tense situations

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60. Ibid., p. 108.

61. Ibid., p. 109.

62. NAM Documents, n. 1, p. 26.

which threatened the world peace, still existed. The Palestine problem, fluid situation in the Cyprus and Indo-China were some of them which called for greater UN involvement. India, despite its differences with China, pleaded for latter's admission into the UN. The Indian delegate said: 'The UN has been moving steadily in the direction of Universality of membership. The major exception is China which is still not a member. Although, we have our differences with China, we have always supported and still support her admission to the United Nations'.<sup>63</sup>

The Cairo Declaration also observed in the similar vein:

Recalling the recommendations of the Belgrade Conference, the Conference asks the General Assembly of the United Nations to restore the rights of the people's Republic of China and to recognise the representative of its Government as the only legitimate representative of China in the United Nations.<sup>64</sup>

In this case also, India's stand was vindicated.

There emerged a consensus among the participating countries on almost all issues deliberated at the second NAM Summit Conference held at Cairo. However, there emerged some difference of opinion with regard to the prin-

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63. Cairo Documents, n. 29, p. 108.

64. NAM Documents, n. 1, p. 26.

ciple of co-existence. This difference emerged when Indonesia wanted to insert into the definition of peaceful co-existence a declaration on "Confrontation" between emerging nations and the old forces of imperialism. A compromise was arrived at when some countries supporting Indonesian proposal agreed to withdraw their suggestion on the condition that nuclear bases abroad and economic blockade would be condemned.<sup>65</sup> The final declaration on peaceful co-existence was largely based on the Indian draft. India had submitted a ten-point Charter, which included the fundamental principles of peaceful co-existence between nations with different socio-economic and political system.<sup>66</sup>

The comparative content-analysis of the speech by India at the Cairo Summit and the final Cairo Declaration reveals a close resemblance and identity of views between the two. There was complete identity of views between India and the other non-aligned countries on major global issues and the suggested means to tackle these problems. Thus India played a constructive role at the second NAM Summit Conference at Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964.

The success of the Cairo Summit was another milestone in the annals of the non-aligned movement.

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65. Malabika Banerjee, n. 17, p. 80.

66. Times of India (New Delhi), 6 October, 1964.

### CONCLUSION

Emergence of Non-aligned Movement (NAM) has been the most remarkable event of the post-second World War period which has changed the pattern of global behaviour. No ideology or creed has ever formed the basis of foreign policy pursued by so many countries as the NAM. With the passage of time, the NAM has gathered enough momentum because of its in-built dynamism, willingness of its members to profess and practise its principles, and its utility as shield against outside overt or covert threats. It is currently the most widely accepted form of foreign policy practised by maximum number of countries.

Pursuit of independent foreign policy designed to envisage national integrity and territorial sovereignty has been the ultimate objective of every country since the advent of modern state. This objective remained to a few countries of Europe and elsewhere for centuries. The bulk of other countries being subjected to colonial domination for centuries could not realise this objective. The conclusion of Second World War inaugurated the process of decolonization. The colonial powers like United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany, Italy, France, Portugal, etc., were forced to relinquish their colonies by the contemporary developments. The tidal wave of independence swept across Asia in

late 1940s and within a decade it enveloped the continent of Africa too. The resultant impact was the emergence of newly independent countries in Asia and Africa.

The concomitant remarkable development of the post-Second World War period was the emergence of cold war between the United States and Soviet Union, both Super Powers. The post-war period had witnessed the decline of erstwhile colonial powers in Asia and Africa thus creating a so-called "power vacuum", Washington and Moscow tried to bring the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa under their respective spheres of influence. This competition between the Super Powers for winning over new spheres of influence assumed the form of Super Power rivalry. The United States under Truman Doctrine declared its policy of global containment of communism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949 with US as its leader.

Besides, Washington also patronised other regional and bilateral military alliances like South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Pacific Treaty Organization (ANZUS) etc. Over 40 countries were involved in US-sponsored military alliances. The Soviet Union and its East European allies



being alarmed at the mushroom growth of US-sponsored military alliances, also founded Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in 1955. The ostensible objective underlying the formation of these military alliances was the fear of one Super Power from the other.

Such a rapid proliferation of military alliances under the auspices of the Super Powers was deemed with suspicion by the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa as portents of threat to their security. These countries having been subject to colonial rule for centuries were determined to preserve their hard-won independence by not getting entangled into the military pacts. The newly independent countries wanted to pursue an independent foreign policy and to harness their resources for economic development and national reconstruction.

The national leadership of India during the period of freedom struggle had espoused for the liberation of people under colonial rule throughout the world. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who later became free India's first Prime Minister and main architect of India's foreign policy, had declared in September 1946, at a time when India had not yet attained independence, that the free India would pursue an independent foreign policy of keeping India a way from the military alliances being forget

by great powers. A few months prior to attaining independence, India played a key role in bringing about two dozen independent countries of Asia together in March 1947 by hosting first Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi. This solidarity of newly independent countries was being forged at a time when the cold war between the Super Powers was reaching at its plateau.

The idea of pursuing an independent foreign policy and of keeping away from the military alliances found favour with majority of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. These countries perceived in cold war military alliances a new threat to their independence. Until the late 1950s the term "non-alignment" had not gained currency. The policy of keeping away from the military alliances was being connoted as "neutrality" or "neutralism".

In the wake of term "non-alignment" gaining currency in late 1950s, the pursuit of an independent foreign policy and the policy of keeping away from military alliances of great powers was termed as the policy of non-alignment. A country practising this policy came to be called as a non-aligned country. The success of first Asian Relations conference of March 1947 had encouraged India and other countries of Asia to pursue their independent national policies without getting entangled into

military alliances forget by Great Powers. In 1949, another conference of Asian countries was convened to discuss the question of Indonesia. The recommendation of this conference had due impact on the contemporary developments leading to the independence of Indonesia from Dutch colonialism. The newly independent countries of Asia continued their efforts in forging closer cooperation among themselves. India, Indonesia, Burma, Sri Lanka and other countries made sincere efforts in furthering this cooperation. The Bandung Conference held in Indonesia in 1955 marked another milestone in this direction. It was attended by 25 countries including India and gave a call for world peace and security of smaller nations.

. The later half of 1950s witnessed the tidal wave of independence sweeping across the African continent and by 1960 more than two dozen African countries had shaken off the colonial yoke and become independent. Majority of these newly independent countries of Asia and Africa had opted for the policy of non-alignment. A need was felt for organising a summit conference of the countries pursuing the policy of non-alignment. A group of countries headed by Indonesia was making efforts to convene a second Bandung type conference - a move which was opposed by other non-aligned countries. Imbued with the desire of convening a summit conference, India, Egypt and Yugoslavia started

mobilising support among the Afro-Asian countries. Prolonged negotiations and sustained efforts by Nehru, Nasser and Tito, soon yielded fruitful results when it was decided to hold a preparatory meeting of the non-aligned countries at Cairo in June 1961. The Cairo Preparatory Meeting evolved through consensus a criterion on membership, the practice of which could make a country eligible to participate in the Non-aligned Summit Conference. It was incumbent upon a country to be eligible to participate in a Non-aligned Summit Conference to be an active practitioner of the policy of non-alignment, non-participation in military alliances forged by the Super Powers, opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism and support for national liberation movements.

Thus having laid down the criteria for membership of the NAM at Cairo Preparatory Meeting, a Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries (NACs) was held at Belgrade (Yugoslavia) in September 1961. It was attended by 25 countries of Asia and Africa with a few observers from Latin America.

India one of the leading non-aligned countries played a valuable role at the Belgrade Conference. Although in the beginning, India was not very enthusiastic about the idea of the Conference. Such Indian attitude was perhaps

governed by the fact that, apart from the general outlook of non-alignment, common to the non-aligned countries, their motives, perceptions and policies were heterogeneous to a great extent.

As Tito, Nasser and Soekarno went ahead with the idea of convening the Conference, India also endorsed it and actively cooperated with these countries.

India's stand that the NAM was not a "third force" or "third power bloc" but an on-going movement gained full support of the participating countries.

India's Prime Minister at the Conference urged the participating non-aligned countries to accord top priority to world peace and attached a special urgency to it. India's suggestion, though opposed by some countries for their anti-colonial stance, was finally taken up by the Conference. This resulted in issuing a special statement on 'Danger of War and Appeal for Peace' to Super Powers. It was a vindication of India's stand. India gave a lead to the NAM at Belgrade Conference without trying to dominate it.

While expressing concern over the apartheid policy of the white racist regime of South Africa, India emphasised that the policy of South Africa was a symbol of racial arrogance, and racial discrimination, which was an intolerable position to be accepted by any nation.

The importance of India's emphasis for the elimination of racialism was envisaged in the final declaration adopted by the NAM Summit at Belgrade. The Belgrade declaration resolutely condemn the policy of apartheid practised by the Union of South Africa and demanded the immediate abandonment of this policy, as it was a grave violation of the Charter of the United Nations and Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

While refering to socio-economic problems faced by the newly independent countries, India emphasised that though foreign economic assistance was necessary, but it was also essential for the developing countries to mobilize their own resources, because if by some miracle or somebody's help, the countries stood up, they would tend to fall down again. The similar emphasis was discernible from the final declaration adopted by the NAM Summit held at Belgrade. It urged the need for making efforts to remove economic imbalance inherited from colonialism and imperialism.

Exactly a year after the Belgrade Summit Conference, the relations between India and China had deteriorated considerably leading to the hot exchange of hostilities between the two countries in October 1962. The Chinese aggression on India proved to be greatest test

of latter's non-aligned policy. India faced the Chinese attack with all might and regarded it unwise to undertake extra-ordinary measure which might discard the character of non-aligned diplomacy. Under the shadow of the Chinese aggression India solicited help from the western countries, and the Soviet Union.

In view of the Western arms and other kinds of military help to India, it was speculated by some countries that India's non-alignment might get diluted. But in the course of time it became clear that only some pro-Chinese non-aligned countries like Indonesia, Guinea, Mali, Ghana, etc., were being prejudiced against India and had given rise to such speculations. Thus India in the event of Chinese aggression was able to procure, requisite arms and economic aid both from the East and West because of its policy of non-alignment. The military aid acquired by India from outside was designed to make it-self capable of safeguarding country's territorial integrity. It devised long term defence planning, keeping in tune with India's policy of non-alignment.

After Nehru's death in May 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri became the Prime Minister of India, and he too followed Nehru's policy. Lal Bahadur Shastri represented India at the Cairo NAM Summit as Jawaharlal Nehru, could not live long to see the movement ripening into fruition.

The Second NAM Summit Conference at Cairo addressed itself to the urgent task of maintaining peace throughout the world and envisage international cooperation instead of confrontation. Lal Bahadur Shastri as a leader of the Indian delegation in the second Non-Aligned Summit said that the government and people of India stood dedicated to freedom and peace, and to the principle of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence and for the eradication of racialism and colonialism. The Indian delegate made no direct reference to the establishment of foreign military bases, especially by the United States and the need for dismantling them, but it does not mean that India supported the establishment of US military bases in other countries, because the final declaration adopted by the second NAM Summit held at Cairo made an elaborated reference to the issue. The final declaration noted with concern the fact that foreign military bases in practice were a means of bringing pressure on nations and retarding their emancipation and development. Thus India as a member of NAM declared its full support to the evacuation of foreign bases and called upon all countries maintaining troops and bases in other countries to remove them. It also accused the United States for maintaining its military base at Guantanamo in Cuba in defiance of the will of the Cuban People. The Conference



called upon the US Government to "Negotiate the evacuation of this base with the Cuban Government".

India appreciated the role of the United Nations (UN) which as a whole has given support to the policies and programmes of peace, freedom and progress and urged the non-aligned nations to support the UN not inwards but in action. It envisaged a greater responsibility on the non-aligned countries in strengthening the peace keeping operations of the U.N.

Thus, India played a significant role in the first and second NAM Summit Conferences. It made concrete and substantial contribution in strengthening the non-aligned movement. India's active participation in the first two NAM Summit proved instrumental in providing a new impetus to the NAM which was manifested in the rapid proliferation of its strength in the years to come.

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